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ABSTRACT 
 
Multi-Agent System for Predictive Reconfiguration 
of Shipboard Power Systems. (December 2003) 
Sanjeev Kumar Srivastava, B.E., University of Gorakhpur; 
M. Tech., Indian Institute of Technology, Delhi 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Karen Butler-Purry 
 
The electric power systems in U.S. Navy ships supply energy to sophisticated 
systems for weapons, communications, navigation and operation. The reliability and 
survivability of the Shipboard Power System (SPS) are critical to the mission of a 
surface combatant ship, especially under battle conditions. In the event of battle, various 
weapons might attack a ship. When a weapon hits the ship it can cause severe damage to 
the electrical system on the ship. This damage can lead to de-energization of critical 
loads on a ship that can eventually decrease a ship’s ability to survive the attack. It is 
very important, therefore, to maintain availability of energy to the connected loads that 
keep the power systems operational. Technology exists that enables the detection of an 
incoming weapon and prediction of the geographic area where the incoming weapon will 
hit the ship. This information can then be used to take reconfiguration actions before the 
actual hit so that the actual damage caused by the weapon hit is reduced.  
The Power System Automation Lab (PSAL) has proposed a unique concept called 
“Predictive Reconfiguration” which refers to performing reconfiguration of a ship’s 
power system before a weapon hit to reduce the potential damage to the electrical system 
caused by the impending weapon hit. The concept also includes reconfiguring the 
electrical system to restore power to as much of the healthy system as possible after the 
weapon hit. 
This dissertation presents a new methodology for Predictive Reconfiguration of a 
Shipboard Power System (SPS). This probabilistic approach includes a method to assess 
the damage that will be caused by a weapon hit. This method calculates the expected 
probability of damage for each electrical component on the ship. Also a heuristic method 
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is included, which uses the expected probability of damage to determine reconfiguration 
steps to reconfigure the ship’s electrical network to reduce the damage caused by a 
weapon hit. This dissertation also presents a modified approach for performing a 
reconfiguration for restoration after the weapon hits the system. In this modified 
approach, an expert system based restoration method restores power to loads de-
energized due to the weapon hit. These de-energized loads are restored in a priority 
order. The methods were implemented using multi-agent technology.  
A test SPS model based on the electrical layout of a non-nuclear surface combatant 
ship was presented. Complex scenarios representing electrical casualties caused due to a 
weapon hit, on the test SPS model, were presented. The results of the Predictive 
Reconfiguration methodology for complex scenarios were presented to illustrate the 
effectiveness of the developed methodology. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The electric power systems in U.S. Navy surface combatant ships supply energy to 
sophisticated systems for weapons, communications, navigation and operation. The 
reliability and survivability of a Shipboard Power System (SPS) are critical to the 
mission of a surface combatant ship, especially under battle conditions. In the event of 
battle, various weapons might attack a ship. When a weapon hits the ship it can cause 
severe damage to the electrical system on the ship. This damage can lead to de-
energization of critical loads on a ship that can eventually decrease a ship’s ability to 
survive the attack. It is very important to maintain availability of energy to the connected 
loads that keep the power system operational.  
There exist technology that enables the detection of an incoming weapon and 
prediction of the geographic area where the incoming weapon will hit a ship. This 
information can be used to perform reconfiguration actions, before the hit, so that the 
damage caused to the power system by the weapon hit is reduced. In the literature no 
methodology, which can perform such task, was found. Therefore there is a need is to 
develop a new methodology, which can perform such a task. 
Researchers in Power System Automation Laboratory (PSAL) at Texas A&M 
University have developed two methods for performing reconfiguration of SPS for load 
restoration. In one of these methods, an optimization based approach is used to 
reconfigure loads, de-energized from battle damage induced faults, satisfying the 
operational requirements [1]. In the other method, an expert system based approach for 
reconfiguration for load restoration of SPS restores loads de-energized due to fault in a 
SPS, considering the priorities of loads and satisfying the system constraints [2]. Both of 
these methods were developed to reconfigure the SPS after weapon induced faults occur. 
 
____________________ 
This dissertation follows the style and format of IEEE Transactions on Power Systems. 
CHAPTER I 
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Further, researchers in the PSAL have proposed a unique concept called “Predictive 
Reconfiguration” which refers to performing reconfiguration of the ship’s power system 
before or after a particular action (e.g. missile hit). Five methodologies were defined to 
address the various aspect of the Predictive Reconfiguration problem. 
Reconfiguration to meet operational needs – The objective of this methodology is to 
reconfigure from one system configuration to another to meet operational demands. 
Pre-hit reconfiguration for damage reduction – The objective of this methodology is 
to reconfigure the ship’s electrical system, before a weapon hit, to reduce the potential 
damage to the power system caused by a weapon hit. 
Pre-hit reconfiguration (restoration) – The objective of this methodology is to 
quickly reconfigure (restore) loads de-energized due to a weapon hit. In this case when 
an incoming weapon is detected analysis is begun in order to determine the restoration 
actions so that the reconfiguration (restoration) of the system can be performed as 
quickly as possible after the hit. 
Post-hit reconfiguration for load restoration – The objective of this methodology is to 
reconfigure the power system to restore power to as much of the healthy system as 
possible after failure(s) have occurred due to a weapon hit. 
Predetermined reconfiguration (restoration) of failure(s) – The objective of this 
methodology is to compute and save reconfiguration strategies for a selected set of 
severe (catastrophic) fault scenarios. If one of the scenarios occurs, the predetermined 
reconfiguration actions could be implemented immediately.  
A methodology which addresses the “Pre-hit Reconfiguration for damage reduction” 
aspect of the Predictive Reconfiguration methodology must assess the damage that will 
be caused by a weapon hit. In the literature, various discussions can be found on the 
different types of weapons used in an attack. The effectiveness of these weapons against 
a specified target is described in terms of “probability of kill”. This value determines the 
probability of destroying a specified target for a given set of conditions. The accuracy of 
a type of weapon is also described in terms of the “miss distance”. This value describes 
the distance by which a weapon might miss the target. Various factors can affect the 
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accuracy and effectiveness of a weapon. This leads to indeterminacy in assessing the 
damage that will be caused by a weapon hit. Therefore the weapon hit damage 
assessment is undeterministic or probabilistic. This undeterministic or probabilistic 
information should then form the basis of determining the reconfiguration control 
actions. But performing reconfiguration, using the undeterministic or probabilistic 
information, is a challenge. In this dissertation, the author presents a new methodology 
to perform Predictive Reconfiguration of SPS to reconfigure the SPS before a weapon 
hit such that damage that will be caused by the actual weapon hit is reduced. The author 
has addressed the pre-hit reconfiguration for damage reduction aspect of the Predictive 
Reconfiguration. 
The major contributions in this dissertation are in four areas. First, a probabilistic 
method to assess the damage that will be caused by the hit of an incoming weapon was 
developed to obtain the expected probability of damage for each electrical component of 
the ship. Secondly, a probabilistic methodology to perform the reconfiguration of SPS, 
before a weapon hit, was developed. This methodology uses the expected probability of 
damage for each component to determine control actions to reconfigure the SPS, before 
a weapon hit, such that the damage that will be caused to that SPS is reduced. This 
approach addresses the second methodology of the Predictive Reconfiguration problem 
presented earlier.  
Thirdly, multi-agent technology was used to implement the Predictive 
Reconfiguration method. A Multi-Agent System was developed to implement Pre-hit 
Probabilistic Reconfiguration methodology for a SPS. In the Multi-Agent System 
various agents were developed to perform different tasks. 
Finally, the methodology was illustrated using a test SPS model. This test SPS model 
was based on the electric power network found on a non-nuclear surface combatant ship. 
In the illustration the methodology results were compared with the results without Pre-
hit Probabilistic Reconfiguration. These results are presented and discussed. 
1.2 ORGANIZATION 
This dissertation consists of five chapters. Chapter I give an overview of this work 
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and an outline of the dissertation. In Chapter II, the problem of Predictive 
Reconfiguration will be formulated. In this chapter, information obtained in the literature 
regarding various aspects of weapon and its damage will be discussed. A methodology 
to assess the damage, to a SPS, caused by a weapon hit will also be presented in this 
chapter. This chapter further presents a methodology to perform Predictive 
Reconfiguration of SPS. Chapter III will present the implementation of Predictive 
Reconfiguration method using the Multi-Agent System approach. In Chapter IV an 
illustration of the method will be presented. Test cases will be illustrated and the 
methodology will be compared with the case in which no Pre-hit Probabilistic 
Reconfiguration was performed. Finally, in Chapter V, conclusions will be drawn and 
remarks about future work will be presented. 
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2 PREDICTIVE RECONFIGURATION PROBLEM FORMULATION AND 
METHODOLOGY 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Providing continuous mobility, power, and thermal management for shipboard 
combat systems in the presence of major interruptions involving cascading failures is a 
critical mission within the U.S. defense infrastructure [3]. The electrical layout of a 
typical shipboard power system (SPS) found on a surface combatant ship is shown in 
Fig. 2.1. It consists of various components such as generators, protective devices, and 
cables [4]. The three phase generators are delta connected in a ring configuration using 
generator switchboards. Bus tie circuit breakers interconnect the generator switchboards 
that allow for the transfer of power from one switchboard to another. Load centers and 
some loads are supplied power from generator switchboards.  Further, load centers 
supply power to some loads directly and supply power to power-panels to which some 
loads are connected. Feeders supplying power to load centers, power-panels and loads 
are radial in nature, meaning that each load is supplied by a single source at any given 
time. The radial nature of the system is important for ease of fault location and isolation, 
and coordination of the protective devices.  
Loads are categorized as either vital or non-vital and are either three phases or single 
phase. For vital loads, power is available through two separate paths (normal and 
alternate supply paths) via automatic bus transfers (ABTs) or manual bus transfers 
(MBTs). The ABTs are normal path seeking and the alternate path is used only when the 
normal path is not available. The electric motors are also protected from low voltage 
conditions by protective devices called low voltage release (LVR) and low voltage 
protection (LVP). The main coil of the LVR/LVP de-energizes when a low voltage 
condition is present causing the main circuit contacts to open thereby de-energizing the 
load. When the low voltage condition is cleared, LVRs are automatically switched back 
to power again whereas LVPs require an operator to manually restart it and restore load. 
There are also transformers that step-down the voltage from 450 to 120 volts, to supply 
CHAPTER II 
METHODOLOGY 
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the single-phase loads. 
 
 
Fig.  2.1: Electrical Layout of an SPS [4] 
The electric power systems in U.S. Navy ships supply energy to sophisticated 
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systems for weapons, communications, navigation and operation. It is very important to 
maintain availability of energy to the connected loads that keep systems operational [2]. 
In the event of battle, various weapons might attack the ship. There exist technology that 
enables the detection of an incoming weapon and prediction of the geographic area 
where the incoming weapon will hit the ship. When a weapon hits the ship it can cause 
severe damage to the electrical system on the ship. These damages can lead to faults in 
the electrical system, cascading faults in the electrical system, and interruption of power 
supply to the loads. 
The interruption of power supply to critical loads can reduce the ship’s ability to 
survive the attack. The existing technology that provides information regarding an 
incoming weapon and predicts the location of its hit provides a source of information for 
reconfigure the power system, before the actual hit, to reduce the damage to the power 
system. In order to reduce the effects of the weapon damage to the power network, the 
electrical components of the ship that are predicted to be damaged by the weapon hit 
need to be determined. Then the effect of these damaged components on the power 
network needs to be assessed, and finally reconfiguration actions to reduce the effect of 
the damaged components to the operation of the power system need to be determined.  
The prediction of future events, which in this case is prediction of the location of a 
weapon hit and subsequent damaged components, means that an undeterministic or 
probabilistic methodology is needed to assess the weapon damage and determine steps to 
perform reconfiguration to reduce the damage that will be caused by the weapon hit. 
This methodology has been termed, Pre-hit Probabilistic Reconfiguration for damage 
reduction, by this author.  
Once the weapon hits the ship and causes damage to the power network on the ship, 
a methodology is needed to assess the actual damage to the SPS and perform 
reconfiguration to restore de-energized loads that have healthy paths available. This 
methodology is termed, Post-hit Reconfiguration for restoration by this author. Together 
Pre-hit Probabilistic Reconfiguration for damage reduction and Post-hit Reconfiguration 
for restoration perform the function of Predictive Reconfiguration. 
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In this dissertation, a methodology developed to perform Pre-hit Probabilistic 
Reconfiguration for damage reduction, before a weapon hit, is discussed. In this 
methodology, first, the probability that an electrical component will be damaged, due to 
the weapon hit, is computed for all the electrical components in the system. Then the 
heuristics of a probabilistic method developed to determine the reconfiguration steps 
required to reduce the damage that will be caused by the eventual hit, are presented. The 
dissertation also discusses a modified Post-hit Reconfiguration for restoration method, 
originally developed at PSAL [2]. In the method developed at PSAL, the restoration 
method restores load without violating any constraints. This method does not include a 
load shedding feature for situations when generation capacity is not available and critical 
loads need to be restored. In the modified Post-hit Reconfiguration for restoration 
method, a module to perform load-shedding was added. Details of the Pre-hit 
Probabilistic Reconfiguration for damage reduction method are presented in section 2.2. 
Section 2.3 gives the details of the modified Post-hit Reconfiguration for restoration 
method. A black box model of the Predictive Reconfiguration methodology has been 
presented in section 2.4. In section 2.5, a summary of this chapter has been presented. 
2.2 PRE-HIT PROBABILISTIC RECONFIGURATION FOR DAMAGE 
REDUCTION 
As stated earlier, the first function in probabilistic reconfiguration for damage 
reduction is to assess the damage that will be caused by a weapon hit. In this 
dissertation, the author has assumed that the “damage” to an electrical component, due to 
a weapon-hit, means improper functioning of that electrical component caused by the 
weapon hit. In that sense the effect of “damage” to electrical components on the ship, as 
addressed in this work, is presented below: 
Circuit breaker – The “damage” to the circuit breaker leads to an open circuit 
condition on it. 
Components other than circuit breakers – The “damage” to these components leads 
to a short circuit on them. 
After damage assessment, the next function is to use the probabilistic information 
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determined by damage assessment to determine steps for reconfiguring the electrical 
system such that the actual damage to it is reduced. In this section, first the approach for 
weapon hit damage assessment is presented, and then the methodology to determine 
steps for probabilistic reconfiguration is discussed. 
2.2.1 Weapon-hit Damage Assessment  
The main purpose of a weapon (e.g. missile) is to deliver a warhead to a target. A 
warhead is basically a device that is situated in the forward part of the armament system 
of a weapon, such as missile, and contains explosive charge. The function of the 
warhead is to destroy the target so that it cannot perform its mission [5]. The missile is a 
transporting vehicle for the warhead. The warhead essentially consists of a payload, a 
fuse and a safety and arming mechanism. It is the payload that directly causes damage to 
the enemy, and achieves the aim of the weapon.  
Warhead devices can generally be separated into two categories: chemical energy 
warheads and kinetic energy warheads. A chemical energy warhead is a device that 
contains explosives that on detonation create blast and fragmentation effects. The metal 
fragments are quickly accelerated to hypervelocity. However, a device that contains a 
high-density penetrator that is accelerated by propellant toward a target is a kinetic 
energy weapon [5]. 
Warheads may also be classified based on manner in which energy and material 
travel through the environment on detonation. If it is uniform in all directions, it is 
known as an isotropic warhead, but a payload may be designed to release more energy in 
a particular direction. Such a warhead is known as a non-isotropic or directional 
warhead. Both chemical energy and kinetic energy high-explosive warhead types can be 
designed as isotropic or non-isotropic warhead [5]. 
Depending on the number of munitions, warheads may also be divided into two 
categories - unitary warhead and cluster/sub-munitions warhead. As the name indicates 
unitary warheads consist of a single warhead. The payload in the warhead may be of 
blast type or fragmentation type. In blast type, the payload is designed to achieve its 
effect and damage level primarily from blast. The payload is basically high explosive. A 
  10 
fragmentation payload consists of an explosive charge surrounded by a casing.  
A cluster warhead consists of a large cased warhead containing sub-munitions (in 
bomblets) that can be ejected or dispensed to cause maximum effect at a moment 
decided by a fusing mechanism. The weapon (missile) delivers the main warhead to the 
target area where the outer skin maybe removed explosively or by aerodynamic forces 
before the sub-munitions are released. The sub-munitions may be blast, fragmentation 
type or filled with chemical, biological or incendiary material. 
Ships are relatively hard targets and usually require a kinetic energy penetrating 
warhead, followed by blast fragmentation after the penetration of the hull. The most 
common weapons used against ships are anti-ship missiles. The anti-ship missiles are 
generally large in size and have a large warhead. They are designed to survive ship’s 
defenses, relying on either speed or flying at low altitude in clutter to survive. 
A weapon’s effectiveness is its ability to destroy an intended target. In the case of a 
missile, it depends upon the distance from the warhead to the target at the instant of the 
warhead explosion; the missile-velocity and the target-velocity vectors; structural, 
geometrical, and physical characteristics of the target; atmosphere density; and the 
warhead itself. Some parameters, which define a missile’s effectiveness are miss 
distance, lethal radius, circular error probability and single shot kill probability.  
In random situations, when many missiles are fired against a target, all the missiles 
may not hit the target. Due to large number of random factors, the missile will display a 
tendency to miss the target at various distances related to probabilities. It can be said that 
the missile obeys a miss-distance probability distribution [6]. The miss distance of a 
weapon is defined as the distance by which a weapon misses the aimed location. The 
miss distance is calculated from the target intercept plane, and a vector r represents the 
closest point of approach [7]. This vector is normal to the weapon trajectory, and X and 
Y represents the errors of not impacting the target, as shown in Fig. 2.2, for a two 
dimensional case.  
If there is no correlation between the X and Y miss distance, and the means in X and 
Y direction are equal to 0, and the standard deviation in X and Y direction are equal, 
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then the miss distance frequency distribution is expressed by the circular normal 
distribution, given by (2.1) [5]. 
2
2
2
22
1
)( σπσρ
r
er
−=  (2.1) 
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y 
 
Fig.  2.2: Miss Distance Intercept Plane 
 
Where, r is the radial miss distance taken from the target aim location. The circular 
standard deviation is σ . The U.S. military uses a calculation known as circular error 
probability (CEP) to determine weapon accuracy. A circular error probability number is 
the radius of the circle in which a weapon will land at least half of the time. This CEP is 
modeled as equation (2.2) [5]. 
CEP = 1.177σ  (2.2) 
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This CEP equation will model that half of the weapon flights lie inside the specified 
CEP. The other half will lie outside. 
If a large number of identical missiles were fired to destroy a target, then the plot of 
miss distance would be a normal distribution, as shown in Fig. 2.3. This phenomenon is 
known as dispersion and it will happen even in the case of a guided missile. If the target 
is taking an evasive action, then the resulting dispersion will decrease for a guided 
missile than for an unguided missile under the same conditions [8]. 
 
  
 
Distance from 
Target Center 
Probability  
Curve 
Hits 
(Target Center) 
Distribution of Hits 
about Aiming Point 
 
Fig.  2.3: Plot of Miss Distance [8] 
 
A single-shot kill probability of the missile and warhead combination, against 
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specified targets, is defined as the probability with which a given single missile and its 
warhead, when fired against a single target of specified type, will destroy the target. If 
the single-shot kill probability is 0.9, this means that, if a large number of specified 
missiles are individually fired at a specified target, 90 percent of the missiles will destroy 
the target [6]. The probability that weapon aimed at point target will hit it depends upon 
the lethal radius, accuracy, and number of attacking weapons. If n enemy weapons are 
fired to hit a target, then the probability of target destruction/kill is given by (2.3) [9]. 
( ) 22211 CnRP −−=  (2.3) 
 
where,   R  = Lethal radius. 
C  = Circular probable error (CEP) of the attacking weapon. 
 
For 1=n , the probability of target destruction would represent single-shot kill 
probability, given by (2.4). 
( ) 22211 CRP −−=  (2.4) 
 
Lethal radius or radius of destruction can be defined as the radius of a damage 
sphere/circle such that anything coming inside that sphere/circle will be destroyed. In 
other words the probability of kill inside that sphere/circle will be 1. In case of a nuclear 
warhead if the nuclear warhead explodes at the surface of ship, then (2.5) gives the lethal 
radius of the damage sphere/circle [9].  
Lethal radius, 
2
1
3
1
6
H
WR =  (2.5) 
where, 
  R   = lethal radius in nautical miles    
W  = weapon yield in megatons 
                H = target hardness in pounds/sq. inch 
Factors such as weapon yield and the target hardness are responsible for intensity 
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and size of explosion, radiation, pressure wave, shock waves and secondary explosion. 
These factors create difficulty in accurately estimating the lethal radius for a given 
missile. First of all, the hull of a ship is made of multiple materials. Secondly if the 
weapon (for e.g. missile) penetrates the hull of a ship then it can possibly come into 
contact with various other kinds of materials, which have different target hardness. 
Hence to calculate the lethal radius, target hardness of all materials with which the 
weapon comes in contact during explosion needs to be considered. But the task of 
considering the target hardness of all the materials can be practically infeasible. Thus it 
is very difficult to accurately calculate the lethal radius of damage sphere/circle. 
No publicly available literature was found which discusses the details of calculation 
of lethal radius. In some literature where lethal radius was used in the assessment of 
damage caused by the missile hit, it was either assumed to be of fixed length or some 
model, which varies the probability of kill inside the lethal sphere/circle, was used. In 
[10], a special modification of Rand’s Airbase Damage Assessment (AIDA) computer 
model – TSARINA has been described. The purpose of this model is to examine 
conventional air attacks against targets and to assess losses and damages to various 
resources. To estimate the effectiveness of a point-impact weapon, the basic 
mathematical representation used by this model was called a cookie-cutter 
representation. In this representation, a uniform probability of kill over a circle of 
specified radius was assumed. In an attempt to provide greater flexibility for the 
approximate weapon effect representation, different representations were developed. In 
one representation, for example, two-level cookie-cutter representation was used. In this 
representation, an inner circle with a specified probability of kill, and an outer circle 
defined such that the average probability of kill was just one fourth of that for the inner 
circle, was used.  
From the weapon’s effectiveness point of view, the most effective weapon against 
the ships is an anti-ship missile. It is the most common and widely used weapon against 
the ship’s defenses. Although a lot has been discussed in literature regarding the 
missile’s design, its trajectory, type of warhead/payload used and target kill 
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probabilities; no de-classified information is available regarding the process of 
extensively assessing the damage caused by it.  
In order to assess the damage caused by a weapon hit to a ship, it is necessary to 
know the location of weapon hit and the extent of damage the weapon warhead will 
cause on explosion around the hit location.  
The existing technology on board ships detects and identifies an incoming weapon. 
Also it predicts the location where the weapon will hit the ship. Although it is known 
that such technology exist onboard a ship, no literature, which discusses this technology, 
was publicly available. A lot of information, though, was available in literature from the 
attacker’s point of view. In this research work, in order to develop a method for 
assessing the damage caused due to a weapon hit, information that is available to 
attacker is assumed. The problem then is how to use this information to assess the actual 
damage that will be caused due to the eventual hit. From the various discussion made 
earlier its clear that various information available to the attacker is probabilistic in 
nature. It is impossible, therefore, to develop a deterministic solution for the problem of 
weapon damage assessment. The probabilistic information, available to attacker, models 
various uncertainties. It is important, therefore, first to identify and briefly discuss the 
various causes of uncertainties, which affect any deterministic approach. These factors 
are discussed below. 
2.2.1.1 Uncertainty in Location of Weapon Hit 
One possible source of uncertainty is the predicted location where the weapon will 
hit the ship. The exact location of the weapon hit is very difficult to determine. The 
weapon is always aimed to hit at a certain location and its ability to hit that location is 
defined in terms of probabilistic values. The miss distance of a weapon, discussed 
earlier, is defined as the distance by which a weapon misses the aimed location.  
When a weapon is fired, the attacker’s ability to accurately track and guide (in case 
of a guided weapon) the weapon to the aim location determines the weapon miss 
distance relative to the target. If there is an error in the accuracy of the target position, 
then the miss distance will grow. The miss distance is directly related to guidance and 
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track accuracy. The prediction of actual hit location is therefore a source of uncertainty. 
2.2.1.2 Uncertainty Introduced Due to Ship’s Movement 
Uncertainty discussed in previous section was uncertainty introduced due to 
inaccuracy of the incoming weapon. This section discusses another source, which causes 
the uncertainty in the determination of location where the weapon will the hit the ship, 
and that source is the ship’s movements in the seawater. The reason for this uncertainty 
is the ship’s motions in the seawater and effect of waves on the ship’s motions. Ships are 
designed to float upright in calm waters. However, ships rarely sail in calm water. 
Waves, which are the main source of the ship’s motions in a seaway, affect the 
performance of a ship considerably [11]. When the ship moves in a seaway, it makes 
random and simple harmonic motions along three axes – longitudinal, transverse and 
vertical, as shown in Fig. 2.4.  
 
  
 
Fig.  2.4: Ship’s Motion Along the x, y and z Axes of Ship 
 
Basically a ship in seawater can have six different kinds of motions. It has three 
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linear motions, surging, swaying, and heaving. Apart from linear motions it also has 
three rotational motions, rolling, pitching and yawing. Accordingly, 
 
a = surging motion backwards and forwards in the direction of ship 
travel. 
b = swaying         athwartship motion of ship. 
c = heaving         motion vertically up and down. 
d = rolling angular motion about the longitudinal axis. When the ship 
rolls, it lists alternately from starboard to port and then back 
to starboard. 
e = pitching motion about the transverse axis. When a ship pitches, it trims 
alternately by the bow and by the stern. 
f = yawing         angular motion about the vertical axis. 
 
The intensity of these motions depends upon the nature of waves. Due to these 
motions the location of impact of weapon would not be the same as determined earlier at 
the time when the weapon was fired, leading to further uncertainty in predicted location 
of weapon hit. 
2.2.1.3 Uncertainty in Assessment of Extent of Weapon Damage 
When a weapon hits a target, it explodes. This explosion can be accompanied by hot 
gases, fragments traveling at very high velocities, thermal radiation, pressure waves, 
shock waves or other secondary explosions. Extent of damage caused by the weapon hit 
depends on various factors. In the case of a nuclear weapon, as discussed earlier, these 
factors will be the weapon yield and target hardness. It has been already discussed that 
the exact determination of the target hardness is extremely difficult. Hence this can 
cause an inaccurate calculation of lethal radius, leading to the uncertainty in the 
determination of actual damage that will be caused by the weapon hit. 
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2.2.1.4 Probabilistic Approach for Damage Assessment 
As mentioned earlier, in this research work an attempt is being made to develop a 
method to assess the damage that will be caused by a weapon hit, using the information 
available to the attacker. As this information is probabilistic in nature so the developed 
methodology will also be probabilistic in nature. Also, the developed methodology 
should model the various uncertainties mentioned in the earlier sections.  
In this section, a probability based mathematical approach is presented which 
calculates the probability of damage due to a weapon hit, for a point on a ship. In order 
to develop the probability based mathematical approach some assumptions were made 
that basically addresses the various uncertainties mentioned earlier. In the work 
presented in this dissertation, the uncertainty introduced due to the motion of ship in 
rough water has been neglected. The assumptions made in this work are stated below. 
a) It is assumed that the Probability Density Function representing the probability of 
actual hit of weapon at various locations on ship, is known. As shown in Fig. 2.3, 
the plot of miss distance for a series of identical missiles can be defined as a 
normal distribution. A point on the curve of Fig. 2.3 gives the probability by 
which a missile would miss the target for a given “miss distance”. This 
probability can also be interpreted as the probability of hitting a location, which 
is at a distance of given “miss distance” from the location of intended hit. This 
information is from the point of view of entity that is attacking. Since the miss 
distance distribution is a normal distribution, as shown in Fig. 2.3, for the 
purpose of the work presented here, probability density function for the predicted 
location of the weapon hit has also been assumed to be a normal distribution 
[12]. The normal distribution of the predicted hit location of the weapon, with 
respect to the ship’s coordinate axes, is given by (2.6). 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
ezyxp
zyx zyx
2
222
2
32
3
2
1,, σ
µµµ
σπ
−+−+−−=  (2.6) 
where σ  = standard deviation 
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xµ = mean in x direction 
yµ = mean in y direction. 
zµ = mean in z direction. 
The probability of predicted hit will be greatest, at the location represented by 
coordinate points ( )zyx µµµ ,, , with respect to the ship’s coordinate axes. Therefore the 
means ( )zyx µµµ ,,  represent the predicted hit location. If the coordinate axes on the ship 
are moved to the mean ( )zyx µµµ ,, , then (2.6) can be simplified to (2.7), a normal 
distribution with zero mean, with respect to the shifted coordinate axes. 
( ) ( )
( )
ezyxp
zyx
2
222
2
32
3
2
1,, σσπ
++−=  (2.7) 
 
This assumption models the uncertainty involved in the prediction of the location of 
weapon hit.  
b) It is assumed that a function that describes the probability of kill for a point, at a 
given distance from the location of actual hit, is known. This function is referred 
to as the Weapon Damage Function in this dissertation. As discussed earlier in 
section 2.2.1, a flexible cookie cutter representation has been used to assess the 
damage [10]. In that approach, variable values for probability of kill, distributed 
inside the lethal sphere, were assumed. Using the rationale of that approach, in 
the present work, a continuous function that gives the probability of kill for a 
point, as a function of distance from the location of actual hit, has been assumed. 
This function has also been assumed as a normal function with zero mean and 
origin at the location of the actual hit, and is given by (2.8). This assumption 
addresses the uncertainty involved in the assessment of extent of damage caused 
by a weapon hit.  
( ) ( )
( )
ezyxf
zyx
2
0
222
2
3
0
2
3
2
1,, σσπ
++−=  (2.8) 
where 0σ  = effectiveness factor 
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This function is normalized such that the probability of kill at the actual hit 
location is 1, as shown in Fig. 2.5. For normalization, (2.8) was multiplied by 
factor ( ) 30232 σπ , which resulted in the normalized function given by (2.9).  
( ) ( )ezyxF zyx 20222 2,, σ++−=  (2.9) 
 
The effectiveness factor, 0σ , represents a weapon’s effectiveness in destroying a 
target and causing widespread damage. It is discussed in detail, later in this 
section. When the weapon hits the ship, it will explode which will cause primary 
damage to the ship. The explosion due to the weapon hit can also result in 
secondary effects like electromagnetic pulse (EMP), fallout radiation, thermal 
radiation, nuclear radiation, etc. These effects can cause damage to 
communication systems and physical damage to various components. In this 
dissertation, the weapon damage function represents the final damage caused, 
whether due to primary or secondary damage, to the electrical components. 
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Fig.  2.5: Plot of Probability of Kill versus Distance from the Actual Hit Location 
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In the literature, probability of kill has been used to address the probability of 
complete destruction of a target. In the work presented in this dissertation, attempt has 
been made to compute the probability of destruction of an electrical component. During 
the attack on a ship, the actual target is typically not a single electrical component, and 
probability of kill for a ship can also be computed. Hence, in order to avoid any 
confusion, in this work the “probability of kill” for a point has been referred to as 
“probability of damage” for a point. 
If a continuous random variable X  has a probability distribution function ( )Xp , 
then a random variable, which is a continuous function of X  and is denoted by ( )Xg , 
has the expected value given by (2.10) [13]. 
( ) ( )∫ ∫ ∫+∞
∞−
⋅⋅= dXXpXgE  (2.10)  
 
The expected value of function ( )zyxF ,,  defined in (2.9) can be calculated using 
(2.10). This expected value will represent the expected probability of damage (EPOD) 
for a given point. Then the EPOD for a point P at ( )000 ,, zyx , with respect to the shifted 
coordinate axes, is given by (2.11). 
( ) ( )∫ ∫ ∫+∞
∞−
⋅⋅⋅−−−⋅= dzdydxzzyyxxFzyxpEPOD 000 ,,,,  (2.11) 
 
Next substituting the values of ( )zyxp ,,  and ( )000 ,, zzyyxxF −−−  from (2.7) and 
(2.9), respectively, in (2.11), gives (2.12). 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]∫ ∫ ∫+∞
∞−
−+−+−−++− ⋅⋅⋅⋅= dzdydxeeEPOD ooo zzyyxxzyx 20
222
2
222
22
32
3
2
1
σσσπ  (2.12) 
 
Equation (2.12) can be rewritten as (2.13). 
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(2.13) 
Next, (2.13) can be rewritten as (2.14). 
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Separating the exponential with “ x ” variable as a separate integrand gives (2.15). 
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Next let,  
( )
( ) 323
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0
σπ
σek
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= ; ( )220
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1
2
σσ
σ
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and 
( )
22
0
22
0
4 2 σσ
σσ +=k  
 
Then substituting k , 1k , 2k , 3k  and 4k  in (2.15) gives (2.16). 
( ) ( ) ( ) dzdydxeeekEPOD xkxkzkzkykyk ⋅⋅


⋅⋅⋅= ∫ ∫ ∫+∞
∞−
+∞
∞−
−−−−−− .124324224  (2.16) 
 
Next let,  
( ) dxeI xkxk ⋅= ∫+∞
∞−
−− 124
1  (2.17) 
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Substituting 1I  in (2.16) gives (2.18). 
( ) ( ) dzdyIeekEPOD zkzkykyk ⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅= ∫ ∫+∞
∞−
−−−−
1
3
2
42
2
4  (2.18) 
We can write (2.17) as (2.19) 
( ) dxeI kxxk ⋅= ∫+∞
∞−
−− 14
1  (2.19) 
Next using substitution, 
2
1ktx += , then dtdx =  
Substituting the values of “ x ” and “ dx ” in (2.19) gives (2.20). 
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k
t
k
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− 24
2
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Solving (2.20) gives (2.21). 
4
41
2
14
ke
I
kk π⋅=  (2.21) 
 
Substituting the value of 1I  in (2.18) gives (2.22). 
( ) ( )∫ ∫+∞
∞−
−−−− ⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅= dzdyeekekEPOD
zkzkykyk
kk
3
2
42
2
4
2
14
4
4
π  (2.22) 
 
Separating the exponential with “ y ” variable as a separate integrand gives (2.23). 
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Using (2.17) and (2.21), (2.23) can be rewritten as (2.24). 
( )∫+∞
∞−
−− ⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅= dzekekekEPOD
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kkkk
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Again, using (2.17) and (2.21), (2.24) can be rewritten as (2.25). 
4
4
4
4
4
4
2
34
2
24
2
14
kekeke
kEPOD
kkkkkk πππ ⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅=  (2.25) 
 
Solving (2.25) we get (2.26). 
( )
ek
kEPOD
kkkk
4
2
3
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2
14 ++⋅


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Substituting the values of 321 ,,, kkkk and 4k in (2.26) gives (2.27). 
( )( )eEPOD zyx 220
2
0
2
0
2
0
2
2
3
2
0
1
1
σσ
σσ
+
++−⋅


 

+
=  (2.27) 
 
The standard deviation, σ , for the probability distribution function for the location 
of weapon-hit, represents the accuracy of the weapon in hitting the aimed target. The 
smaller the value of, σ , the lesser will be the deviation from the mean value. This means 
that if a weapon is fired, the probability of hitting close to the aimed target will be 
higher. Hence, the smaller the value of σ , the more accurate will be the weapon.  
Suppose a weapon is fired at the ship, and the main aim of that weapon is to destroy 
a target T. Since the aim is to destroy the target T, the coordinates of location of target T 
will become (0,0,0) after transferring the coordinate axes. Then the EPOD for target T 
would be given by (2.27). Now from the logical deduction it can be said the more 
accurate a weapon is the higher is the probability that it will destroy the target T. As 
explained above, the accuracy of the weapon is defined by σ . So lets examine two cases 
with different values of σ . One case with σ  = 2 and the other σ = 8. In each of these 
cases, 0σ  is taken as 5.  
Case 1: σ = 2 
For this case, we compute the value of EPOD given by (2.27). 
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Case 2: σ = 8 
For this case, also we compute the value of EPOD given by (2.27). 
15.0
1
1
2
3
2
0
8 =


 

+
==
σσ
σEPOD  
 
Since 82 == > σσ EPODEPOD , the weapon with σ  = 2 will have a greater probability 
of destroying the target. The results of these cases are the same as obtained from logical 
deduction and i.e., the more accurate weapon will have the greater probability of 
destroying the target. 
The effectiveness factor, 0σ , represents the spread of damage caused by the weapon 
hit. In other words, it represents the measure of a weapon’s effectiveness. The larger the 
value of 0σ , the larger will be the damage caused by the weapon hit. Now, suppose a 
weapon is fired at a ship, and the main aim of that weapon is to destroy a target T. Since 
the aim is to destroy the target T, the coordinates of location of target T will become 
(0,0,0) after transferring the coordinate axes. Then the EPOD for target T would be 
given by (2.27). Now the more effective a weapon is in causing damage, the greater is 
the probability to destroy the target T. As explained above, the effectiveness of the 
weapon is defined by σ . So lets examine two cases with different values of 0σ . One 
case with 0σ  = 2 and in the other with 0σ = 8. In each of these cases σ  is taken as 3. 
Case 1: 0σ = 2 
For this case, we compute the value of EPOD given by (2.27). 
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Case 2: 0σ = 8 
For this case, also we compute the value of EPOD given by (2.27). 
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Since 28 00 == > σσ EPODEPOD , the weapon with 0σ  = 8 will have a greater 
probability of destroying the target. The results of these cases are the same as obtained 
logically i.e., a more effective weapon will have the greater probability of destroying the 
target. 
For a weapon with a given accuracy, defined by σ , and a given effectiveness, 
defined by 0σ , the probability of damage at a point, should decrease with the increase in 
distance from the aimed hit location. Consider two targets T1 and T2 at locations 
( )111 ,, zyx  and ( )222 ,, zyx , respectively.  The distance of these targets from the aimed 
point is given by (2.28) and (2.29), respectively.  
( ) 212121211 zyxr ++=  (2.28) 
( ) 212222222 zyxr ++=  (2.29) 
It is assumed that target T1 is closer to the aimed point than target T2. It implies that 
12 rr > . The EPOD for each of these targets can be calculated using (2.27), and are given 
by (2.30) and (2.31), respectively. In each of these cases, the same σ  and 0σ  values are 
assumed. 
( )eEPOD rT 220
2
1
2
2
3
2
0
1
1
1
σσ
σσ
+−⋅


 

+
=  (2.30) 
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( )eEPOD rT 220
2
2
2
2
3
2
0
2
1
1
σσ
σσ
+−⋅


 

+
=  (2.31) 
  
Since 12 rr > , then for a given σ  and 0σ , 21 TT EPODEPOD > . This result is the 
same as obtained logically that for a given accuracy and effectiveness the probability of 
damage for a location which is closer to the aimed target will be higher than the 
probability of damage for the location which is farther from the aimed target. 
Suppose an ideal weapon is fired to destroy a target T. Since the weapon has been 
assumed to be ideal, it will hit directly at the target location, (0,0,0). The probability 
distribution function of location of hit for such an ideal weapon would be represented by 
a normal distribution function with σ  = 0. The EPOD for target T, in this case, can be 
calculated using (2.27), and the calculation for that is given by (2.32). 
[ ] 101
1
01
1
2
322
3
2
0
=
+
=


 

+
=
σ
TEPOD  (2.32) 
 
1=TEPOD , means that the target would certainly be destroyed. This result also is 
the same as obtained logically that for an ideal weapon, if fired directly at a target, will 
certainly destroy the target. These results show that the EPOD calculated by using 
(2.27), can be deduced logically. None of the cases, discussed above, gave inexplicable 
results. 
The main goal of the Weapon Damage Assessment method is to compute the EPOD 
for electrical components. The EPOD given by (2.27) can be used to compute damage 
probability for each component in the electrical system on the ship. During the 
computation, each electrical component is divided into very small cubes. Let a 
component C be divided into “n” cubes, C1, C2,.., Cn. Let the point where the diagonals 
of the cuboids meet be PC1 ,PC2 ,.., PCn. Then using (2.27), EPOD for each point, where 
the diagonals meet, for all cubes can be calculated. Let these EPOD be represented by 
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EPODPC1, EPODPC2 ,.., EPODPCn. Then the EPOD for the component C, EPODC, could 
be taken as the EPOD that has largest value among all the EPOD values computed for 
all points on component C. This is represented by (2.33).  
( )PCnPCPCC EPODEPODEPODMAXEPOD ,...,, 21=  (2.33) 
2.2.2 Probabilistic Reconfiguration for Damage Reduction  
Once the EPOD for all electrical components is obtained, this probabilistic 
information is used to determine the steps of reconfiguration for damage reduction. In 
the process of reconfiguration for an electrical system, one should know the status of all 
switches in the system. In addition to all the switches’ status, information regarding the 
working status of all electrical components should also be known. If the EPOD of an 
electrical component, C, is 0.8, it means that the component C has 0.8 expected 
probability of getting damaged. In other words, it can be said that the component C has 
0.8 probability that it will not be available to transfer electrical energy. If it were known 
that component C is damaged, then during the process of reconfiguration, steps would be 
determined such that the path of electrical energy flowing through component C is 
reconfigured. Since the damage information regarding component C is probabilistic, 
decisions regarding reconfiguration steps to reconfigure the path of electrical energy 
through component C, cannot be made with certainty. Hence an approach, which deals 
with decision making under uncertain conditions, needs to be developed for performing 
reconfiguration before a weapon hit.   
Artificial intelligence (AI) is a fortuitous discipline to study reasoning during 
uncertain conditions. AI methods encourage one to view uncertainty as a problem to be 
solved by the application of heuristic knowledge [13]. To solve a problem, first goals are 
stated; then they are ordered, which represents the order in which they have to be 
achieved; and lastly the methods are determined to achieve the goals. Similar reasoning 
can be applied to the problem of Probabilistic Reconfiguration.  
The goals of Probabilistic Reconfiguration for damage reduction are: 
• To reduce interruption of electrical supply to vital loads. 
• To reduce faults and cascading faults. 
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In the next sections, heuristic methods developed to achieve the above mentioned 
goals are discussed. 
2.2.2.1 Reduction of Interruption of Electrical Supply to Vital Loads 
The main objective of electrical network on the ship is to supply electrical energy to 
various loads. This electrical energy is supplied via various electrical components, which 
form a radial path from the electrical energy source to load. Some loads (vital loads) in 
the system have more than one possible radial path, i.e., the electrical energy to these 
loads can be provided through more than one path. But at any given time the load gets 
power supply via one path only. The damage assessment output provides the information 
about the probabilities of damage of electrical components in these radial paths.  
A simplified electrical network of an SPS is shown in Fig. 2.6. This network consists 
of two generators (Gen1, Gen2), two switchboards (SB1, SB2), two load centers (LC1, 
LC2), five loads (L1,L2,..L5), thirteen circuit breakers (CB1,CB2,…CB13), fourteen 
cables (CL1,CL2,…,CL14) and one manual bus transfers (BT1). Normal path for the 
BTs are shown by continuous lines and alternate path is shown by dotted lines. In this 
figure two possible radial paths R1 and R2, for a load L2 is shown. Each radial path 
comprises of various electrical components. Also, assume that currently, load L2 is 
getting electrical supply via R2. Now path R1 and R2 comprises of electrical component 
as given below by (2.34) and (2.35). 
 
R1: {L2, CL4, BT1, CL3, CB4, LC1, CL1, CB1, SB1} (2.34) 
R2: {L2, CL4, BT1, CL10, CB8, LC2, CL7, CB6, SB2} (2.35) 
 
Let us suppose (EPOD)C represents expected probability of damage for a component 
C. Now Availability Probability (AP)C for a component C is defined as the probability 
that the component C will be able to transfer electrical energy through it in case of the 
weapon hit. 
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Fig.  2.6: Two Possible Paths for a Load L2 
 
In a SPS electrical components can be divided into two categories, switch-controlled 
devices and not switch-controlled devices. A device, Ci, which is not a switch-controlled 
device, can transfer electrical energy if it is not damaged. Since (EPOD)Ci represents 
expected probability of damage for Ci, so the AP for Ci is given by (2.36). 
(AP)Ci = 1-(EPOD)Ci (2.36) 
  
Next, consider a component Cj, which is a switch-controlled device, for e.g. a circuit 
breaker. In this case Cj will be able to transfer electrical energy through it if it is not 
damaged and is in closed position. If expected probability of damage for Cj is (EPOD)Cj 
and its status (close or open) is represented by SCj then AP for Cj is given by (2.37). If 
status of Cj is closed then SCj = 1, otherwise if Cj is in open position then SCj = 0. 
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(AP)Cj = [1-(EPOD)Cj] * SCj (2.37) 
 
Next, consider path R1, shown in Fig. 2.6. In path R1 if any one electrical 
component is damaged then path R1 will not be able to supply electrical energy to load 
L2. Also, if circuit breaker CB3 is damaged such that it leads to a short circuit fault at 
CB3, then because of coordination between protective devices, CB1 will open causing 
interruption of supply in path R1. In case if the damage on CB3 leads to an open fault 
condition at CB3, then it will not cause opening of CB1. This means that in order to 
supply power in path R1, none of the circuit breakers at load center level should be in 
short circuit fault condition. This means that all electrical components in path R1 and all 
circuit breakers at load centers, with a short circuit fault, are in series; as damage to 
anyone of these components will result in interruption of electrical supply to load L2. 
It is extremely difficult to tell beforehand, that damage to a circuit breaker will lead 
to a short circuit fault or an open circuit fault. If we assume that the probability that 
damage caused by a weapon hit will lead to an open circuit fault on a circuit breaker is 
p1, then the probability that the circuit breaker will have a short circuit fault, in the event 
of a weapon hit, is (1-p1). Given that the weapon hit has occurred, the three possible 
states of a circuit breaker C, with expected probability of damage EPODC, are shown in 
Fig. 2.7. State 1 represents the situation if the weapon hit does not cause damage to 
circuit breaker. State 2 represents the situation if the circuit breaker is damaged and has 
an open circuit fault. State 3 represents the situation if the circuit breaker is damaged and 
has a short circuit fault. 
The probability that the circuit breaker will not be damaged is given by (2.38). 
PC,not damaged = 1-EPODC (2.38) 
 
The probabilities of an open circuit or a short circuit fault on the circuit breaker, in 
the event of a weapon hit is given by (2.39) and (2.40). 
PC,damaged, open circuit = p1*EPODC (2.39) 
PC,not damaged, short circuit = (1-p1)*EPODC (2.40) 
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The probability that the circuit breaker C will not be in the state of short circuit after 
the weapon hit is given by (2.41). 
PC, not short circuit = 1- PC,not damaged, short circuit  = 1- (1-p1)*EPODC (2.41) 
 
  
State 1 
State 3 
 
State  2  
   
Probability of  
State 2 = (1-p1)*EPODC 
Damaged with an 
short circuit fault 
Damaged with an 
open circuit fault 
Probability of  
State 1 = 1-EPODC 
Not damaged 
Probability of  
State 3 = p1*EPODC 
 
Fig.  2.7: Possible States of Circuit Breaker after the Weapon Hit 
 
If we define Path Availability Probability (PAP) as the probability that a path can 
transfer electrical energy through it, after a weapon hit, then the PAP for path R1 is 
given by equation (2.42). 
(PAP)R1 = (AP)L2*(AP)CL4*(AP)BT1*(AP)CL3*(AP)CB4*(AP)CL1*(AP)CB1*(probability 
that CB3 is not short circuited)     (2.42) 
 
Substituting (2.41) in (2.42) gives (2.43). 
(PAP)R1 = (AP)L2*(AP)CL4*(AP)BT1*(AP)CL3*(AP)CB4*(AP)CL1*(AP)CB1*[1-(1-p1CB3)* 
EPODCB3]        (2.43) 
 
As stated earlier, it is very difficult to tell beforehand, that damage to a circuit 
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breaker will lead to a short circuit fault or an open circuit fault. For the work reported in 
this dissertation, it is assumed that damage to a circuit breaker will always lead to an 
open circuit condition. Hence, in that case p1 = 1. Therefore, (2.43) reduces to (2.44). 
(PAP)R1 = (AP)L2*(AP)CL4*(AP)BT1*(AP)CL3*(AP)CB4*(AP)CL1*(AP)CB1 (2.44) 
 
In other words, if a path “Rk” has “n” components and their APs are represented by 
[(AP)C1, (AP)C2,… (AP)Cn], respectively, then Path Availability Probability for that path is 
given by equation (2.45). 
( ) ( )∏=
=
n
i
CiR APPAP k 1
 (2.45) 
 
PAP for an electrical path basically gives a measure of success a path will have in 
delivering electrical energy to the load in that path. The higher the PAP for a path, the 
higher will be the success that path will have in providing electrical energy to a load. In 
other words, suppose a load L2 has two paths R1 and R2 (refer to Fig. 2.6). PAP for R1 
and R2 is (PAP)R1 and (PAP)R2, respectively. (PAP)R1 > (PAP)R2 implies that path R1 
has higher probability of  delivering the electrical energy to load L2 when the weapon hit 
occurs. Therefore if the present (pre hit) supply path for load L2 is not R1 then the load 
L2 should be reconfigured so that it receives electrical energy via path R1; otherwise no 
reconfiguration steps are required. This procedure is shown in Fig. 2.8. 
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If (PAP)R1 > (PAP)R2 
Reconfigure to path R2 
Yes No 
Reconfigure to path R1 
Calculate PAPR1 and PAPR2 for load L
If R2 is the supply path 
for load L 
If R1 is the supply path 
for load L 
No No Do Nothing
Yes Yes 
 
Fig.  2.8: Heuristic for Reduction of Interruption of Electrical Supply to Loads 
 
The control actions determined by RRSI will always involve a change of electrical 
supply path of bus transfers. The bus transfer on a SPS can be of two types – automatic 
and manual. In order to change supply path of a manual bus transfer (MBT), a direct 
command can be given to it which would be “transfer BT”. But for an automatic bus 
transfer (ABT), no direct command can be given to it. Hence in order to change its 
supply path, the circuit breaker (CB) of the supply path from which the electrical supply 
is to be transferred (to the other path) is given a command to open. Hence for ABTs the 
control action would be to “Open CB” upstream. 
Implementing a control action involves a certain cost. If the difference in the 
(PAP)R1 and (PAP)R2 is very little, then in that case it might be a good decision to 
disregard the suggested control action. Also it is possible that the difference in PAPs 
might be substantial, but the individual PAP values are small. In these cases, it might be 
a good decision to not implement the suggested control action. Hence as a probabilistic 
measure of the control action, the absolute value of the difference in PAP of both R1 and 
R2, and the PAP value of the selected path should be provided as an output. It is then up 
to the operator to decide whether the suggested action should be implemented. 
The heuristic explained above is applied to loads that have more than one supply 
path. In a SPS, loads are categorized as vital or non-vital. Vital loads have two paths 
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available to them. The method presented here is only applicable for vital loads. Since the 
objective of this method is to reconfigure vital loads such that the probability of supply 
interruption to those vital loads is reduced, the method is referred to as Reconfiguration 
for Reduction of Supply Interruption for vital loads.  
2.2.2.2 Reduction of Faults and Cascading Faults  
When a weapon hits a ship, it causes damage to electrical components of the ship 
leading to electrical faults and possibly cascading faults in the system. Suppose the 
components that will get damaged can be exactly determined, before the weapon hit 
takes place, and these components can be isolated then the electrical faults and cascading 
faults can be completely prevented. But since the weapon hit is a future event; it is 
impossible to exactly predict the components that will be damaged by a weapon hit. But 
the expected probability of damage for components determined by the Weapon hit 
Damage Assessment methodology, discussed earlier, can be used to identify components 
that have a very high probability of being damaged. Using a threshold value, 
components can be identified that have expected probability of damage, EPOD, higher 
than the threshold value, or in other words have a high probability of being damaged. If 
these identified components are isolated before a weapon hit takes place, then although it 
cannot be said that the electrical faults and cascading faults have been completely 
prevented, the chances of electrical faults and cascading faults occurring are reduced.  
The EPOD value for a component represents the probability that component has of 
getting damaged, but it does not state for certainty that the component will get damaged. 
Thus a component that has an EPOD value higher than the threshold maybe isolated 
before the weapon hit, but after the weapon hit the component may not be actually 
damaged. In that case, it is possible that because of the isolation of that component, the 
electrical supply to some load downstream of that component might get interrupted. If 
the load is a vital load, then interruption of electrical supply to that load might reduce the 
ship’s chances of surviving the attack. Therefore it is better not to isolate component, 
upstream of a vital load, which have damage probability higher than the threshold. That 
is why the methodology to prevent electrical faults and cascading faults is included only 
  36 
for non-vital loads, i.e., only the components lying in the radial path of non-vital 
components are considered for isolation. Hence this method is referred to as 
Reconfiguration for Component Isolation for non-vital loads. 
In order to illustrate the idea presented above, some cases are presented. These cases 
are based on a simplified electrical network of an SPS, as shown in Fig. 2.9. This 
network consists of two generators (Gen1, Gen2), two switchboards (SB1, SB2), two 
load centers (LC1, LC2), five loads (L1,L2,..L5), thirteen circuit breakers 
(CB1,CB2,…CB13), fourteen cables (CL1,CL2,…,CL14) and two manual bus transfers 
(BT1,BT2). Continuous lines show normal path for the BTs and alternate path are shown 
by dotted lines.  
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Fig.  2.9: Simplified Electrical Network for a SPS 
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The components having EPOD greater than the threshold and lying in the path 
supplying power to a non-vital load are referred to as non-critical components. It has 
been assumed that there was a situation in which a missile was detected. Therefore, in 
order to assess the damage that will be caused by the actual weapon hit, Weapon-hit 
Damage Assessment methodology, as explained in section 2.2.1, was executed. This 
computed EPOD for each component. For all the cases, a threshold expected probability 
of damage limit, EPODthreshold, has also been assumed. As stated earlier that in this 
method only non-vital load are considered, so in all these cases only the non-vital loads 
L1 and L4 are considered. Different cases are presented below. 
 
Case 1 
Consider that among all the components in the electrical network, only cable CL2 
had expected probability of damage, EPODCL2, greater than the threshold. In other words 
EPODCL2 > EPODthreshold. Then to isolate CL2, before an actual hit, the circuit breaker 
upstream of CL2, CB3, needs to be opened. This action, if implemented, will cause de-
energization of load L1. In the event of actual hit if cable CL2 is actually damaged, then 
load L1 will be de-energized anyway. If CL2 was isolated before the weapon hit takes 
place, then electrical faults or cascading faults, which can happen because of damage to 
CL2, have been prevented. In case CL2 did not get damaged by the weapon hit and was 
isolated before the weapon hit, then de-energization of L1 was not required and should 
be restored by a Restoration program. But since load L1 is a non-vital load, so it can be 
assumed that its temporary de-energization will not reduce the ship’s chances of 
surviving the attack. 
 
Case 2 
In this case, only circuit breaker CB9 was determined as the non-critical component 
having EPOD greater than the threshold. Mathematically it can be written as, EPODCB9 > 
EPODthreshold. Since we have assumed that a circuit breaker is open circuited by the 
damaged caused to it due to a weapon hit, there are no isolating steps required to isolate 
circuit breaker CB9. If the circuit breaker CB3 is damaged by the weapon hit, then it will 
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result in de-energization of load L4. In the event that CB9 is not damaged by the weapon 
hit, then load L4 will not be de-energized.  
 
Case 3 
In this case, only load center LC1 was determined as the component having EPOD 
greater than the threshold. Mathematically it can be written as, EPODLC1 > EPODthreshold. 
Then in order to isolate LC1, the circuit breaker upstream of LC1, CB1, needs to be 
opened. This action, if implemented, will result in de-energization of loads L1 and L2. In 
case that LC1 is not damaged by the weapon hit but was isolated before the weapon hit, 
then de-energization of L1 and L2 was not required and should be restored by a 
Restoration program.  
Results of the three cases discussed above have been summarized in Table 2.1. For 
each case, it shows the non-vital load; non-critical component; actions to isolate the non-
critical component; load(s) which will be de-energized if the non-critical component is 
isolated; and the last column shows the affect of not performing the component isolation, 
and after the weapon hit that non-critical component was actually damaged. 
Implementing a reconfiguration action involves a certain cost. In some situations, the 
operator may decide not implement a suggested component isolation action. The PAP 
for the radial path supplying power to a non-vital load and containing the non-critical 
component is a good measure to decide whether the suggested actions should be 
implemented. If the PAP value for that path is high, then it means that the path has a 
high probability of supplying electrical power to the non-vital load, after the weapon hit. 
So in that case, the operator may decide not to implement the suggested isolation action. 
Hence, the PAP value is also provided as an output along with the suggested component 
isolation actions, as a probabilistic measure of the suggested control action. This would 
aid the operator in deciding whether the suggested actions should be implemented. 
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Table 2.1 
Results of Reconfiguration for Component Isolation for Load L1 
Case 
No. 
Non-
vital 
load 
Non-critical 
component with 
EPOD > 
EPODthreshold 
PAP of 
path 
for 
load 
Component 
Isolation 
Actions 
De-energized 
loads 
Affect of not performing 
component isolation; and the 
component is damaged after 
the weapon hit 
1 L1 CL2 PAPL1 Open CB3 L1 
L1 de-energized 
Possibility of electrical faults 
and cascading faults. 
2 L4 CB9 - - - L4 de-energized Possibility of cascading faults.
3 L1 LC1 PAPL1 Open CB1 L1, L2 
L1 & L2 de-energized 
Possibility of electrical faults 
and cascading faults. 
 
In the cases discussed above, it was assumed that only one component had EPOD 
greater than the cut-off limit. If there is more than one component that has EPOD greater 
than the threshold, then based on the component’s location there are two possible 
scenarios. 
Scenario 1: Components are in different radial paths 
In this case, since in a given radial path there is only one component that has EPOD 
greater than the threshold, the isolation actions for that component should be determined 
as explained earlier. 
 
Scenario 2: Components are in the same radial path 
In this scenario, consider that there are two electrical components, C1 and C2, in the 
same radial path with EPOD greater than threshold. Also, C1 is situated upstream of C2. 
Then it is possible that isolating C1 can also lead to isolation of C2. For e.g., consider 
path R1, which is supplying power to the non-vital load L1, as shown in Fig. 2.9. Let us 
assume that EPOD for cable CL2, load center LC1, and cable CL1 is greater than the 
cut-off limit. In that case, if cable CL1 is isolated by opening circuit breaker CB1 then 
this action will also isolate cable CL3 and load center LC1. Hence it is possible that 
isolating one upstream non-critical component can lead to isolation of some downstream 
non-critical components. Hence in the case when there is more than one non-critical 
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component in a radial path, then only the farthest upstream non-critical component needs 
to be considered for isolation. The isolation procedure has already been discussed 
earlier.  
2.2.2.3 Pre-hit Probabilistic Reconfiguration Methodology 
In this section, the overall Pre-hit Probabilistic Reconfiguration methodology will be 
presented, which aims to reduce of supply interruption to vital loads and reduce 
electrical faults and cascading faults due to a weapon hit. This methodology uses the two 
heuristic methods developed in previous sections. It will be shown, that after the 
execution of the weapon-hit damage assessment method, the combination of 
Reconfiguration for Component Isolation (RCI) method and Reconfiguration for 
Reduction of Supply Interruption (RRSI) method for non-vital loads, will result in 
reconfiguring the system such that the goals of Pre-hit Probabilistic Reconfiguration are 
achieved. To be exact it will be shown that executing RCI, on the SPS, followed by the 
execution of RRSI will lead to achieving the goals of Pre-hit Probabilistic 
Reconfiguration. 
Consider the electrical network shown earlier in Fig. 2.9. It is assumed that the 
weapon-hit damage assessment method was performed and its output is shown in Table 
2.2. Only some of the components are shown in Table 2.2.  
 
Table 2.2 
Output of Weapon Damage Assessment 
Component Component Type EPOD 
CB1 Circuit Breaker 0.12 
CL1 Cable 0.23 
LC1 Load Center 0.69 
CB3 Circuit Breaker 0.54 
CL2 Cable 0.76 
L1 Load 0.67 
L5 Load 0.01 
CL8 Cable 0.60 
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Using the EPOD values shown in Table 2.2, the RCI method was performed. It can 
be seen from Fig. 2.9, that there are three non-vital loads in the electrical network - L1, 
L4, and L5. In the RCI method, the radial path for each of these loads is formed and 
components with EPOD greater than a threshold are identified. The threshold for this 
case is assumed to be 0.5. Then isolation actions for components that have an EPOD 
value greater than the threshold and is farthest upstream in the radial path are 
determined. Table 2.3 shows the output of RCI for each non-vital load. This table shows 
that for load L1 and L5 the non-critical components were determined as LC1 and CL8, 
respectively. For load L4 there were no components found that have EPOD value greater 
than the threshold. The table also shows control actions for isolating components LC1 
and CL8 and L5 and the PAP values associated with these actions. Implementation of 
these actions will result in de-energization of load L1. 
 
Table 2.3 
Output of RCI 
Non-vital Load Non Critical Component Control Action PAP 
L1 LC1 Open CB1 0.007 
L4 - - - 
L5 CL8 Open CB7 0.121 
  
After determination of control actions by RCI, RRSI was performed. Since RRSI is 
performed after RCI, the control actions suggested by the RCI and which the 
user/operator has selected for implementation should be considered implemented while 
determining control actions for reduction of supply interruption. Based on the control 
actions selected by the user/operator, RRSI can result in different sets of control actions. 
The user/operator can select any combination of control actions determined by the RCI 
method. The next step is then to determine the output of RRSI for possible combinations 
of control actions. Since the RRSI module only considers vital loads so not all the 
control actions, determined by RCI, will have an affect on the output of RRSI. For 
example, in the case presented here the control action to “Open CB7” will have no 
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influence on the determination of control actions by RRSI. But the other action to “Open 
CB1” will influence the output of RRSI because the opening of CB1 will also result in 
interruption of electrical supply to the normal path of the vital load L2. In the case 
presented here the output of RRSI is required to be computed for two different cases. In 
one case, it is assumed that the control action “Open CB1” was implemented, and in the 
other case it was assumed that this control action was not implemented. Also it was 
assumed that all the vital loads were getting electrical supply through manual bus 
transfers via their normal paths. The output of RRSI for each of these two cases is shown 
in Table 2.4 and Table 2.5. 
 
Table 2.4 
Output of RRSI When “Open CB1” Control Action Is Implemented 
Vital Load PAP Normal PAP Alternate Control Action 
L2 0.0 0.43 Transfer BT1 
L3 0.79 0.91 Transfer BT2 
 
Table 2.5 
Output of RRSI When “Open CB1” Control Action Is Not Implemented 
Vital Load PAP Normal PAP Alternate Control Action 
L2 0.48 0.43 - 
L3 0.79 0.91 Transfer BT1 
 
Table 2.4 shows control actions determined by the RRSI method after implementing 
the control action to open CB1 for vital loads L2 and L3. The PAP value for the normal 
radial path for load L2 was 0 as it contains the circuit breaker CB1, which is open and so 
has an AP value of 0. Table 2.5 shows control actions for vital loads when the control 
action to open CB1 is not implemented. In this case the PAP value of the normal radial 
path for load L2 was found to be greater than the PAP value of its alternate radial path. 
Hence no control actions were suggested for Load L2 in this case.  
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The final output of the Pre-hit Probabilistic Reconfiguration, for the case presented 
here, will be two different sets of control actions. These two sets are determined on the 
basis of two combinations of control actions determined by RCI method that can affect 
the RRSI method. These two sets of control actions are shown in Table 2.6 and Table 
2.7. Each of these tables summarizes the results of RCI and RRSI and they also give the 
probabilistic information associated with each control action. 
 
Table 2.6 
Final Output of Pre-hit Probabilistic Reconfiguration Method When “Open CB1” Control Action Is 
Implemented 
Determined 
Control Actions 
PAP of radial path 
for non vital load 
PAPbest path for 
vital load 
PAP difference for 
vital load 
Open CB1 0.007 - - 
Open CB7 0.121 - - 
Transfer BT1 - 0.43 0.43 
Transfer BT2 - 0.91 0.12 
 
Table 2.7 
Final Output of Pre-hit Probabilistic Reconfiguration Method When “Open CB1” Control Action Is Not 
Implemented 
Determined 
Control Actions 
PAP of radial path 
for non vital load 
PAPbest path for 
vital load 
PAP difference for 
vital load 
Open CB1 0.007 - - 
Open CB7 0.121 - - 
Transfer BT2 - 0.91 0.12 
 
2.3 POST-HIT RECONFIGURATION FOR RESTORATION 
After the Pre-hit Probabilistic Reconfiguration has been performed, a weapon hit 
takes place. The steps taken for Pre-hit Probabilistic Reconfiguration for damage 
reduction on the SPS, before the weapon hit, does not guarantee that none of the loads 
will be de-energized due to the eventual damage caused by the weapon hit. When the 
incoming weapon actually hits the ship, it will cause damage leading to fault(s) in SPS. 
  44 
Because of these fault(s), protection equipment will operate and some of the loads may 
be de-energized. One or more of these loads might be loads that are vital for ship 
survivability. Researchers at PSAL have developed a Failure Assessment method that 
detects fault(s) and determines components in faulted sections of the SPS [14]. The 
output of this method is a list of faulted sections’ damaged components and de-energized 
loads. Researchers at PSAL have also developed an expert system based reconfiguration 
for restoration methodology, XRest, to restore de-energized loads [2]. These methods 
can be combined to assess faults resulting from weapon damage and restore supply to 
the de-energized loads. In the XRest methodology, constraint check for generation 
capacity constraint violations, while performing restoration was not performed. In the 
event of generation capacity constraint violations, no load-shedding can be performed to 
disconnect non-vital loads to restore de-energized vital loads. Hence the methodology 
was modified such that the generation capacity constraint violations are checked and in 
the event of a violation, load-shedding is performed. In this section, the modified 
restoration methodology is presented. The reconfiguration for restoration methodology is 
discussed along with the load-shedding module. 
2.3.1 Modified Reconfiguration for Restoration Methodology 
The Reconfiguration for Restoration methodology consists of various systems such 
as Geographical Information System (GIS), Failure Assessment System (FAST) and 
Expert System Restoration (XRest). Fig 2.10 shows the block diagram representation of 
the Expert System Reconfiguration for Restoration scheme. The real time measurements 
data for a SPS are continuously updated in real time tables in a GIS database. The real 
time data consists of line currents, node voltages, generators frequency, circuit-breakers 
(CBs) status, LVRs/LVPs status, and BTs status measurements. The FAST uses 
historical data from the Historical database, frequency, voltage and current deviation 
limits from the Constraint database and real time data from the GIS database to detect 
and locate faults. Once a fault is detected and located, the output of FAST, the de-
energized loads and faulted sections information, is provided as input to the XRest 
module. Various static, connectivity and real time information from the GIS database are 
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also provided as input to XRest module. It also uses as input, the node voltage limits, 
cable current limits, and generation capacity limits as input from the Constraint database. 
The XRest module then determines which loads are restorable. Further it determines the 
control actions to restore each restorable load. The control actions represent the control 
commands for CBs, MBTs and LVPs. Various systems shown in Fig. 2.10 are discussed 
in the following sections. 
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Fig.  2.10: Block Diagram of Expert System Reconfiguration for Restoration Method 
 
2.3.1.1 Real Time Data Measurements 
The real time data, shown in Fig. 2.10, are continuously measured and updated in the 
real time table in GIS database. Real time data consisted of: 
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A. Current measurements for Generators, Circuit Breakers, Loads, Power-
Panels, Load Centers, Switchboards and Transformers. 
B.  Voltage measurements for Generators, Cables, Loads, Power-Panels, Load 
Centers, Switchboards and Transformers. 
C. Circuit breakers’ status.  
D. LVPs’ and LVRs’ status.  
E. Bus Transfers’ position.  
F. Generators’ power and frequency 
2.3.1.2 GIS Database 
A Geographic Information System (GIS) is a computerized system designed to 
capture, store, process, analyze and manipulate characteristic and spatial data [15]. A 
GIS consists of two parts: digital map and database. Basically a GIS integrates digital 
diagrams such as computer-aided design and drafting (CADD) diagrams with 
information systems such as relational database management systems (RDBMS). The 
database of the GIS is used in the Reconfiguration for Restoration method as shown in 
Fig. 2.10. In this method, Microstation was used to model a Shipboard Power System 
based on the geographical 3-dimensional layout profile of a typical surface combatant 
ship. 
A three-dimensional CADD map of the SPS was drawn based on the spatial position 
of the electrical elements of the ship. The elements in the CADD map were linked to a 
GIS database, which was developed using MS Access. The GIS database consists of 
tables that store data for the various electrical elements of SPS. Each type of element has 
a connectivity, a real time data, and a static table. The connectivity table contains 
information about the “from” and “to” nodes for each component, which basically is the 
connectivity scheme of the elements in the system. The real time measurement tables 
store the real time electrical values of the elements and the status of protective devices, 
for a given time. The static parameter tables store electrical parameters of cables, loads, 
transformers, generators, CBs, BTs and LVPs/LVRs. In addition to the GIS database, 
there are other databases such as Historical database and Constraint database, which 
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store information used by the failure assessment and the restoration methods. 
Automated queries were developed to extract the data from the databases and update 
in a local database used by the failure assessment and the reconfiguration for restoration 
methods. 
2.3.1.3 Historical Database 
The historical database, shown in Fig. 2.10, stores real time information for a period 
starting from a pre-fault time to some time after the fault had occurred and the system 
had attained steady state. Historical database consists of: 
A. Circuit breakers’ status. 
B. Voltage of switch boards and load centers.  
C. Current flowing through each circuit breaker.  
This database is used to provide information to the failure assessment module.  
2.3.1.4 Constraint Database 
The constraint database, shown in Fig. 2.10, stores constraint information for cables, 
nodes and generator. Constraint database consists of: 
a. Upper Current constraint for each cable. 
b. Upper and Lower Voltage Constraint for all load nodes.  
c. Generation Capacity Constraint for Generators.  
2.3.1.5 Failure Assessment System (FAST) 
The Failure Assessment System (FAST), shown in the block diagram in Fig. 2.10, 
assesses the damage due to a fault by performing two functions – fault detection and 
fault location. The fault detection function detects abnormal conditions in a SPS. If an 
abnormal condition is detected in a SPS, the fault location function locates the faulted 
section(s) and determines the loads that lost supply due to the fault. This method was 
developed using Rule Base methodology and was implemented using an expert system 
package called Exsys developed by Multilogic [16,17]. The real-time measurements of 
node voltages and line currents and connectivity data are extracted from the GIS 
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database, and are used by FAST to detect abnormalities and identify faulted sections. In 
addition to the GIS database, data is also extracted from the constraint database and 
historical database. 
The fault detection function utilizes the generator’s frequency, voltage at the 
switchboards and load centers, and current measurements at the circuit breakers to 
determine the presence of a fault or an abnormality condition. It determines if current, 
voltage, and frequency measurements are within acceptable levels. If not, then an 
abnormality is detected. Several rules were developed to achieve this. 
The fault location function utilizes the pre-fault and post-fault CBs’ status, pre-fault, 
fault, and post-fault CBs’ current measurements, and pre-fault, fault, post-fault voltage 
measurements at switchboards and load centers. These values are used by heuristics 
based rules to determine the faulted sections and de-energized loads. Further FAST uses 
historical data from the Historical database, frequency, voltage and current deviation 
limits from the Constraint database and real time data from the GIS database to detect 
abnormalities and identify faulted section(s). The output of FAST is a list of components 
in the faulted section(s) and de-energized loads, which serve as input to the Restoration 
method. 
2.3.1.6 Expert System Based Restoration (XRest) 
The Expert System Restoration (XRest) module, shown in Fig 2.10, consists of an 
Expert System, System Analysis module, Load Shedding module, Database Formation 
module, GIS database, Constraints database and Local database. This module first calls 
the Database Formation module. This module uses the output of the failure assessment 
module (de-energized loads and components in the faulted sections) and data from the 
GIS Database to construct a local database as shown in Fig. 2.11. In the modified 
version of XRest, it also considers the loads de-energized due to the control actions 
implemented during the pre-hit reconfiguration process. This information is also updated 
in the local database. The modified part is highlighted by bold dots in Fig. 2.11. The 
XRest module uses data contained in this local database for decision-making. Further, 
the local database contains connectivity information and static information for all 
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electric components. It also contains post-fault CB’s status and BT’s position acquired 
from the GIS real-time tables and the information regarding de-energized loads. The 
XRest module uses data contained in this local database for decision-making. 
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Fig.  2.11:  Block Diagram of Databases Interaction for XRest 
 
After the formulation of the local database, XRest calls the Rule Based Expert 
System (RBES) to reconfigure de-energized loads. A configuration of an electrical 
network at a given instant is defined by the status of switches in the network at that 
instant. In a SPS, the switches that define a configuration are CBs, BTs and LVPs/LVRs. 
The problem of reconfiguration for load restoration is to find an appropriate 
configuration in which the de-energized loads are reconfigured without causing any 
system violations.  
First, the de-energized loads are re-arranged on the basis of their load priority (vital, 
non-vital), by the RBES. Loads having the same priority are further arranged on the 
basis of their location (switchboard or load center), with loads that are fed directly from 
a switchboard given a higher priority. Loads at the same location are further arranged on 
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the basis of their rating, with loads of larger rating given a higher priority. Then the 
RBES picks a de-energized load, based on priority, and tries to determine the control 
actions required to reconfigure that load. For this, the RBES interacts with the Local 
database to obtain the system information consisting of various static, connectivity and 
real time data. Using this information and based on a set of rules, which are explained in 
the next section, RBES determines if the load is reconfigurable or not.  
If the load is reconfigurable, then the RBES suggested an operation sequence to 
reconfigurable the load. The operation sequence consists of changing CB status, MBT 
positions and closing LVP switches. A new configuration was developed based on the 
suggested changes. Then RBES calls System Analysis module to check for any 
constraint violation. The System Analysis module performs load flow, on the new 
configuration. The connectivity scheme of the various electrical components are 
acquired from the local database and used to form the connectivity information input 
files for the Load Flow program. Then changes are made to these files to incorporate the 
changes suggested by the Expert System Restoration module. The Load Flow program 
determines the current flow in the cables and voltage at each node. The System Analysis 
module then checks for any current limit violations through cables and voltage limit 
violations at load nodes. If there are any violations, the load under consideration is said 
to be un-restorable. If there are no violations then the load is restorable and the new 
configuration is stored in the local database.  
Then the next load is chosen from the priority list and the whole process is repeated, 
and for this load the initial configuration is taken as the post-fault configuration plus the 
control actions for the loads, which were previously determined as restorable. This 
process is performed for all de-energized loads, one by one.  
Once all the de-energized loads have been considered then, in the modified 
restoration method, the System Analysis module will again be called to check whether 
the generation capacity constraints are satisfied. To check for the power constraints, total 
load in the system need to be calculated. The de-energized loads that have been restored 
should also be considered while calculating the total load of the system. Then if the total 
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load in the system is greater than the total available generation then the generation 
capacity constraint is said to be violated. In case of such a violation, the System Analysis 
module calls the Load Shedding module, which determines the steps required for load 
shedding.  
Finally, control actions for a new configuration consist of control actions determined 
during the load reconfiguration process and the steps determined by the load shedding 
module (in case of generation capacity constraint violation). In this configuration, as 
much de-energized loads as possible are restored. 
2.3.1.7 Control Commands to CBs, BTs and LVPs 
Once all the de-energized loads have been considered, then the output of the XRest is 
the control commands to CBs, MBTs and LVPs that are required to restore the load and 
to shed loads in case of generation capacity constraint violation. The control commands 
to CBs, MBTs and LVPs, as shown in the block diagram in Fig 2.10, consist of: 
A. Changing circuit breaker status, i.e, to open or close a circuit breaker. 
B. Changing MBT position, i.e., to switch MBT to alternate or normal path.  
D. Closing LVP switch. 
2.3.1.8 Load Shedding Module 
The Load Shedding module should first shed non-vital loads. Once all non-vital 
loads have been considered, then the vital load should be considered for shedding. Vital 
loads should be shed in the order of increasing priority.  
In order to determine the order of shedding, all the loads in the system should be 
arranged in the increasing order of their priorities. As stated earlier, SPSs consist of vital 
and non-vital loads. So vital load, which have higher priority should be arranged lower 
in the order of shedding. Also for the purpose of load shedding loads are assigned a 
category number. For a given priority, load with a higher category number is considered 
more important. Among the loads with same priority and category number the load that 
is receiving supply from the switchboard is given a higher priority than the load 
receiving supply from a load center. Also, load receiving supply from a load center is 
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given a higher priority than the load receiving supply from a power distribution panel. If 
there are more than one load having same priority, category number and source of 
receiving supply, then loads having larger power rating should be higher in the order of 
shedding. The reasoning behind this approach is that, as less as possible number of loads 
should be shed for a given amount of load shedding requirement. 
Once the order of shedding of loads is determined, then loads should be shed in that 
order until the generation capacity constraint is removed. Control actions for load-
shedding should also be an output of restoration methodology.  
A case is presented to illustrate the methodology of Reconfiguration for Load 
Restoration. A simplified electrical network for a SPS is shown in Fig. 2.12. Consider a 
scenario in which a weapon hits the ship. The weapon hit caused damage leading to 
fault(s) in the SPS. A Failure Assessment program, developed at PSAL, detects and 
locates the faults. Output of the Failure Assessment module is the list of faulted 
equipments and the list of loads that need to be restored. In this case it has been assumed 
that no load was de-energized due to control actions of pre-hit reconfiguration. This 
assumption will not affect the process of restoration. The problem then is to perform 
reconfiguration for load restoration. For this example, the output of the Failure 
Assessment module is shown in Table 2.8. 
 
Table 2.8 
Output of Failure Assessment Module 
Components in Faulted 
Sections Component type De-energized loads 
Xfmr11 Transformer 
C1109 Cable 
C1113 Cable 
C2117 Cable 
CB65 Circuit Breaker 
Elex1AB, Elex1BC, 
Elex1CA, Torpedo, 
LCP9AB, LCP9BC, 
LCP9CA, Elex2 and 
Sonar 
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Fig.  2.12: A Simplified Electrical Network for a SPS 
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Based on the priority method discussed earlier, the loads are arranged in the priority 
order listed below: 
 Sonar, Torpedo, Elex2, Elex1AB, Elex1BC, Elex1CA, LCP9AB, LCP9BC, 
LCP9CA.  
After the determination of priority order, the method determines if each load can be 
restored 
 
Sonar 
For load – Sonar, alternate path via MBT5 was available (Fig. 2.12). But when it was 
transferred to alternate side a current constraint was violated in the cable C1204. Hence 
the load Sonar was unrestorable, even though it had an alternate supply.  
 
Torpedo 
Alternate path via MBT6 was available for Torpedo (Fig. 2.12). Hence the control 
action suggested for Torpedo – Transfer MBT6 
 
Elex2 
Alternate supply via MBT2 was not available for Elex2 (Fig 2.12) as the alternate 
cable C2117 was damaged. Hence load Elex2 was unrestorable. 
 
Elex1AB, Elex1BC & Elex1CA 
Although these single-phase loads had alternate supply via BT - MBT1 (Fig 2.12), 
there was a fault downstream of the BT so these load were unrestorable.  
 
LCP9AB, LCP9BC & LCP9CA 
These single-phase loads could not be restored because these loads do not have the 
alternate path.  
Finally, when reconfiguration actions for all the de-energized loads had been 
determined, then power constraints were checked. For the weapon hit scenario presented 
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here there were no power constraint violations. The results for the Post-hit 
Reconfiguration for Load Restoration procedure are summarized in Table 2.9. 
 
Table 2.9 
Results of Post-hit Reconfiguration for Load Restoration 
De-energized 
Load 
Restorable or 
Unrestorable 
Control Actions for 
Restorable loads 
Reason for being 
Unrestored 
Sonar Unrestorable - Current constraint violation 
Torpedo Restorable Transfer MBT6 - 
Elex2 Unrestorable - No path found 
Elex1AB Unrestorable - No path found 
Elex1BC Unrestorable - No path found 
Elex1CA Unrestorable - No path found 
LCP9AB Unrestorable - No path found 
LCP9BC Unrestorable - No path found 
LCP9CA Unrestorable - No path found 
 
2.4 BLACK BOX MODEL OF PREDICTIVE RECONFIGURATION 
METHODOLOGY 
In this section a black box model of the Predictive Reconfiguration Methodology for 
a SPS has been presented as shown in Fig. 2.13. This model shows the inputs to the 
Predictive Reconfiguration and its outputs. As shown in the figure the Predictive 
Reconfiguration methodology takes several information as input. One input to the 
Predictive Reconfiguration method is the information regarding the detected weapon. 
This information consists of the predicted pdf (probability density function) of the 
weapon hit location and the Weapon Damage Function. Apart from these inputs the 
model also requires information that is intrinsic to ship. This information consists of 
static, connectivity, real-time, and geographic data related to electrical components of 
the SPS. The static information consists of electrical parameters and constraint 
information of various electrical components in the SPS. The connectivity information 
consists of the “to” and “from” node information of various electrical components of the 
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ship. The real-time information consists of working status, statuses of various switches, 
current and voltage information of various electrical components of the SPS. Finally the 
geographical information consists of the geographic location and dimensions of various 
electrical components of the SPS. 
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Fig.  2.13: Black Box Model of Predictive Reconfiguration Methodology 
 
Using these inputs the model first determines and outputs the control actions, before 
the weapon hit, to reduce the damage that can be caused by the weapon hit. After the 
weapon hit the model also determines the control actions required to restore the loads, 
which are de-energized due to the faults caused by the weapon hit. 
2.5 SUMMARY 
In this chapter, first, the problem of Predictive Reconfiguration was formulated. 
Various factors, which affect the assessment of damage that will be caused by the hit of 
an incoming weapon, were also addressed. Assumptions were made, based on the 
information found in the literature, to develop a probabilistic method to assess the 
damage that will be caused by the weapon hit. Using these assumptions a method to 
compute the expected probability of damage for an electrical component was presented. 
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Then two modules, Reconfiguration for Component Isolation and Reconfiguration 
for Reduction in Supply Interruption, which performed pre-hit reconfiguration, were 
discussed. The first module determined control actions to isolate components having 
high expected probability of damage. This module only considered the components in 
the radial paths supplying power to the non vital loads. The second module determines 
control actions to reduce supply interruption to vital loads.  
The Pre-hit Probabilistic Reconfiguration method, using these modules, was 
presented. The Pre-hit Probabilistic Reconfiguration determined control actions to 
reconfigure a SPS such that the damage that will be caused by a weapon hit is reduced. 
Probabilistic measures were also outputted along with each control action to assist the 
operator in deciding which control actions to implement. A modified Post-hit 
Restoration method was also presented which determines control actions to perform 
reconfiguration for restoration of SPS, after a weapon hit. Finally, a black box model of 
Predictive Reconfiguration methodology was presented to illustrate the inputs and 
outputs of the method.  
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3 IMPLEMENTATION 
  
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
A software agent is a software entity which functions continuously and 
autonomously in a particular environment, often inhabited by other agents and processes 
[18]. In a Multi-Agent system (MAS), agents act individually and/or in cooperation with 
other agents to fulfill goals set by the initiations of them and thereby maximize some 
expected utilities [19]. In this work a MAS, for pre-hit reconfiguration, has been 
developed. This MAS will perform reconfiguration for damage reduction, before a 
weapon hit, and reconfiguration for load restoration, after the weapon hit. It consists of 
agents that perform various tasks locally, and cooperate with each other to achieve a 
bigger goal. The two major agents, which use expert systems, were developed to 
determine the control actions required to perform reconfiguration for damage reduction 
and reconfiguration for load restoration.  
3.2 MULTI-AGENT SYSTEM (MAS) 
Wooldridge and Jennings (1995) have defined an agent, as “a computer system that 
is situated in some environment, and that is capable of autonomous action in this 
environment in order to meet its design objectives.” An abstract view of an agent is 
shown in Fig. 3.1. This figure shows the action output generated by the agent in order to 
affect its environment. An agent will not have complete control over its environment, in 
most domain of reasonable complexity. At best it will have partial control, in that it can 
influence its environment. This means that from an agent’s point of view the same 
actions performed twice in apparently identical circumstances might appear to have 
entirely different effects [20].  
CHAPTER III 
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ENVIRONMENT
Action 
Output
Sensor 
Input 
 
Fig.  3.1: An Agent in Its Environment 
 
An intelligent agent is expected to have the following capabilities, as suggested by 
Wooldridge and Jennings [21]. 
Reactivity  
Intelligent agents are not only able to perceive their environment but are also able 
to respond in a timely fashion to changes that occur in it in order to satisfy their 
design objectives. 
Proactiveness  
Intelligent agents are able to exhibit goal-directed behavior by taking the 
initiative in order to satisfy their design objectives.    
Social ability  
Intelligent agents are capable of interacting with other agents (and possibly 
human) in order to satisfy their design objectives. 
 
MAS are typically distributed systems in which several distinct components, each of 
which is an independent problem solving agent, come together to form some coherent 
whole [22]. In [22], d’Inverno and Luck have written – “a MAS is any system that 
contains 
1. Two or more agents 
2. At least one autonomous agent; and 
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3. At least one relationship between two agents where one satisfies the goal 
of the other.” 
Fig. 3.2 illustrates the typical structure of a MAS [23]. The system consists of a 
number of agents that interact with one another through communication. The agents 
have ability to act in an environment and have different “spheres of influence”. This 
means that they will have control over or will have ability to influence different parts of 
the environment. In some cases these “spheres of influence” may overlap or coincide. 
This gives rise to dependency relationships between the agents. Agents will also be 
linked with each other by other relationships [20].  
 
 
Sphere of Influence 
Environment 
------- organizational relationship 
 Interaction 
 agent 
 
Fig.  3.2: Typical Structure of MAS [23] 
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Recently, some discussions on multi-agent technology application to utility power 
systems have been presented [24,25,26,27,28,29]. The problem of Predictive 
Reconfiguration consists of various complex sub-problems, such as weapon damage 
assessment, Pre-hit Probabilistic Reconfiguration, failure assessment after weapon hit, 
determination of de-energized loads, determination of restoration actions, system 
analysis, and load shedding. An MAS allows simultaneous complex tasks to be 
performed in real time [30]. The basic approach behind MAS is to decompose a complex 
problem into a number of (less complex) sub-problems. Each sub-problem falls under 
the responsibility of an agent. Since sub-problems are interrelated, a co-ordination 
mechanism is applied to ensure that local decisions lead to a globally desirable result 
[31]. This approach results in a modular and flexible software solution, which is well 
suited for the problem of Predictive Reconfiguration. 
3.3 EXPERT SYSTEM 
An expert system is a computer program that emulates the search behavior of 
human experts in solving a problem [32]. The most commonly used programming 
methodology is rule or knowledge based, in which rules are used to implement an 
expert’s years of experience which creates the ability to distinguish one problem from 
another and to reach corresponding solutions. In general, the expert system approach is 
beneficial for problems that involve non-trivial logic reasoning and human knowledge. 
For such problems, the expert system technique provides a natural way to represent the 
knowledge and implement the inference procedure. The problem of reconfiguration in 
shipboard power systems is a problem in which finding a solution involves the analysis 
of a large number of alternatives or possible combinations or to be exact, possible 
switching combinations. It is important to reduce the number of alternatives to a 
manageable number. An expert system is a good tool to efficiently search through the 
possible combinations and then determine a feasible solution. Hence agents, based on 
expert systems, were developed to solve the problem of Predictive Reconfiguration.  
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3.4 MAS FOR PREDICTIVE RECONFIGURATION 
Fig. 3.3 shows the block diagram of the MAS developed to perform Predictive 
Reconfiguration for shipboard power systems. In the MAS shown in Fig. 3.3, the Failure 
Assessment agent and the Post-hit Restoration agent to perform reconfiguration for 
restoration of a SPS have been developed, earlier, by researchers in the PSAL group at 
Texas A&M University.  
The Query agent, shown in Fig. 3.3, interacts with other agents and extracts data, 
required by an agent, from the various databases. Coordination is central to a MAS for 
without it, any benefits of interaction vanish and the group of agents quickly degenerate 
into a collection of individuals with a chaotic behavior. The Pre-hit Coordination agent, 
shown in Fig. 3.3, is a coordinating agent that coordinates the activities of other agents. 
When an incoming weapon has been detected, the Pre-hit Coordination agent calls the 
Weapon Damage Assessment agent. This agent obtains information regarding 
characteristics of the incoming weapon, predicted location of weapon hit, the 
information regarding location of electrical components on the ship, dimensions of 
electrical components, and status and connectivity information of various electrical 
components, through the Query agent. This information is then used to determine the 
expected probability of getting damaged for each component, once the weapon hits the 
ship. After this, the Pre-hit Coordination agent then calls the Pre-hit Reconfiguration 
agent.  
Pre-hit Reconfiguration agent takes as input the expected probability of damage for 
each electrical component, provided by the Pre-hit Reconfiguration agent, and then it 
determines the reconfiguration actions to reduce the possible damage. After 
determination of the reconfiguration actions, Pre-hit Reconfiguration agent calls System 
Analysis agent to check for any current or voltage constraint violations that may be 
caused due to the implementation of reconfiguration actions suggested by the Pre-hit 
Reconfiguration agent. In case, if the System Analysis agent finds a constraint violation 
for a reconfiguration action, then that reconfiguration action is discarded.  Then the Pre-
hit Reconfiguration agent stores the un-discarded reconfiguration actions in the 
  63 
Reconfiguration database through Query database. Finally, after interacting with the Pre-
hit Reconfiguration module, the Pre-hit Reconfiguration agent will give as output the 
reconfiguration actions for new configuration for damage reduction, and the list of loads 
that will go out of service in the new configuration.  
Once the Pre-hit Coordination agent has determined the control actions for the new 
configuration, it passes controls to the Post-hit Coordination agent. This agent is also a 
coordinating agent. It then calls the Failure Assessment agent. The Failure Assessment 
agent then calls the Query agent, to obtain system information, consisting of current, 
voltage, generator frequency, CB status and BT status measurements. The Failure 
Assessment agent then performs a continuous check to identify an abnormal condition in 
the SPS. When an abnormal condition is detected, the Failure Assessment agent tries to 
assess the abnormal condition. If the Failure Assessment agent identifies the abnormal 
condition as fault(s), then it tries to detect and locate the fault(s). Once the fault(s) have 
been detected and located, the information regarding the de-energized load(s) and the 
component(s) in the faulted sections are given as output.  
The Post-hit Coordination agent takes the output of the Failure Assessment agent and 
calls the Post-hit Restoration agent to determine reconfiguration steps for restoring the 
de-energized loads. This module takes as input the components in the faulted sections 
and de-energized loads, provided to it by the Pre-hit Reconfiguration agent, and then 
determines the control actions to restore as much load as possible. While determining the 
control actions, the Post-hit Restoration agent interacts with System Analysis agent to 
check for any current or voltage constraint violations that may be caused due to the 
implementation of control actions for a de-energized load. In case, if the System 
Analysis agent finds a constraint violation for control actions for a de-energized load, 
then those control actions are discarded and the load is determined as unrestorable. Once 
the control actions for all the de-energized loads have been determined, the Post-hit 
Restoration agent again calls the System Analysis agent to check for any generation 
capacity constraint violation. In case of a constraint violation, Load Shedding agent is 
called to perform load-shedding. The control actions for load shedding are stored in the 
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Restoration database through Query agent. Once the interaction of the Post-hit 
Coordination agent with the Post-hit Restoration module is complete, Post-hit 
Coordination agent then gives the list of restorable loads and control actions required to 
restore each load, as output. If load-shedding was performed then the loads which are to 
be shed and control actions to shed those loads are also given as output by the Post-hit 
Coordination agent. 
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Fig.  3.3: Block Diagram of Multi-Agent System for Predictive Reconfiguration of Shipboard Power 
System 
 
3.4.1 Query Agent 
The function of the Query agent, shown in Fig. 3.3, is to extract appropriate 
information from various databases, as required by any contacting agent, and provide 
that information back to the contacting agent. The Query agent consists of a set of 
queries that extract information from the databases, as shown in Fig. 3.4. For e.g., if an 
Interacting Agent requires data {a,b,c,d}, it contacts the Query agent and conveys its 
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requirements. The Query agent then contacts appropriate databases through appropriate 
queries, extracts the data, and returns the extracted data to Interacting agent. The Query 
agent extracts the required data from GIS, Historical, Constraint, Reconfiguration and 
Restoration databases. GIS, Historical and Constraint databases are global databases. 
Reconfiguration and Restoration databases are local databases created during the 
execution of Pre-hit Coordination and Post-hit Coordination agents respectively. The 
Query agent was implemented using Microsoft Visual C++. All the databases were 
developed using Microsoft Access. 
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Fig.  3.4: Interaction of Query Agent with Other Databases 
 
A Geographic Information System (GIS) is a computerized system designed to 
capture, store, process, analyze and manipulate characteristic and spatial data [16]. A 
GIS consists of two parts: digital map and database. A GIS integrates digital diagrams 
such as computer-aided design and drafting (CADD) diagrams with information systems 
such as relational database management systems (RDBMS). A CADD tool, 
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MicroStation was used to develop a model of a Shipboard Power System based on the 
geographical 3-dimensional layout profile of a typical surface combatant ship. 
The three-dimensional CADD map of the SPS was drawn based on the spatial 
position of the electrical elements of the ship. The elements in the CADD map were 
linked to a GIS database, which was developed using MS Access [33]. The GIS 
database, shown in Fig. 3.4, consists of tables that store data for the various electrical 
elements of SPS. Each type of element has a connectivity, a real time data, and a static 
table. The connectivity table contains information about the “from” and “to” nodes for 
each component, which is the connectivity scheme of the elements in the system. The 
real time tables store the real time electrical measurements at various locations in the 
system and the status of protective devices, for given time instant(s). The static 
parameter tables store static information such as rating, and resistance, inductance and 
capacitance of various components of SPS.  
The historical database, shown in Fig. 3.4, stores real time information for a previous 
time period. For example, when used by the Fault Assessment agent it contains real time 
information, starting from a pre-fault time to some time after the fault had occurred and 
the system had attained steady state. The Historical database consists of circuit breakers 
status, voltage at switchboards and load centers nodes, and current flowing through each 
circuit breaker. The Failure Assessment agent uses this database.  
In addition to the GIS database and Historical database there, is another global 
database, Constraint database. This database has information regarding the upper current 
ampacity for each cable and the upper and lower voltage limit for each load node. The 
Constraint database also has information regarding the generation capacity limits. This 
database is used when constraint checking is performed on the electrical network.  
As explained earlier, Reconfiguration and Restoration databases are local databases, 
as they are used by pre-hit reconfiguration and post-hit reconfiguration for restoration 
programs, respectively. The main objective of these databases is to provide ease in 
implementation of the methodologies and to provide a buffer between permanent 
databases and the program implementing Predictive Reconfiguration methodology. This 
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buffer was important as it protected GIS database from being corrupted. Details of these 
databases will be given in the sections discussing Pre-hit Coordination and Post-hit 
Coordination agents. 
3.4.2 Pre-hit Coordination Agent 
The Pre-hit Coordination agent is a coordinating agent and its function is to 
coordinate the activities of other agents and output a new configuration scheme that will 
reduce the damage that might be caused by the hit of an incoming weapon. The Pre-hit 
Coordination agent is called when an incoming weapon is detected. Then this agent calls 
various other agents in order to achieve its objective of suggesting a new configuration 
scheme. This agent is also responsible for giving as output the list of loads going out of 
service and the reconfiguration control actions for the new configuration. The Pre-hit 
reconfiguration agent has to provide this information before the actual hit. Then the 
suggested reconfiguration control actions along with the probabilistic values are 
outputted. The operator then selects some or all the control actions, from the outputted 
reconfiguration control actions, for implementation. When the Pre-hit Coordination 
agent has achieved its objective it passes the control to the Post-hit Coordination Agent. 
The Pre-hit Coordination agent was implemented using Microsoft Visual C++.  
The block diagram of the Pre-hit Coordination agent is shown in Fig. 3.5. The Pre-hit 
Coordination agent consists of two modules – Database Creation Module and Agent 
Coordination Module. First, the Database Creation module creates a local database – 
Reconfiguration database. This database is created by the Query agent, using the GIS 
database. This database consists of connectivity and static information for all 
components. This database also consists of tables to store the intermediary results during 
the execution of the Pre-hit Probabilistic Reconfiguration. The Reconfiguration database 
is destroyed when the Pre-hit Coordination agent achieves its objective. After the 
formation of the Reconfiguration database, the Agent Coordination module is called. 
This module coordinates the activities of the other agents. It also decides which agent to 
call, at different stages of execution of the Pre-hit Probabilistic Reconfiguration.   
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Fig.  3.5: Pre-hit Coordination Agent 
 
3.4.3 Weapon Damage Assessment Agent 
The function of the Weapon Damage Assessment agent, refer to section 2.2.1, is to 
assess the damage that might be caused to the electrical network of the SPS by an 
incoming weapon, and to output the expected probability of damage (EPOD) of each 
electrical component. The Weapon Damage Assessment agent is called by the Pre-hit 
Coordination agent, when an incoming weapon is detected. This agent then assesses the 
possible damage that might be caused when the weapon actually hits the ship and 
calculates the probability of damage for each electrical component of the SPS. Once the 
Weapon Damage Assessment agent has performed its function it notifies the Pre-hit 
Coordination agent. The Weapon Damage Assessment agent was implemented using 
Microsoft Visual C++. 
The block diagram of the Weapon Damage Assessment Agent is shown in Fig. 3.6. It 
consists of two modules, EPOD of Point Calculation Module and EPOD of Component 
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Calculation Module. EPOD of Point Calculation Module takes as input, the predicted 
probability density function of weapon hit location, the function representing the weapon 
damage effectiveness, and the coordinates of locations of all electrical components. This 
module first transfers the ship’s coordinate axes to the location represented by the means 
of the predicted probability density function and recalculates the location of all electrical 
components with respect to the transferred axes. It then calculates the EPOD for a point 
situated at some distance from the predicted hit location.  
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Fig.  3.6: Weapon Damage Assessment Agent 
 
The EPOD of Component Calculation Module then uses the information provided by 
the EPOD of Point Calculation Module to compute the EPOD for each electrical 
component. In order to compute EPOD for each component, it uses the information 
about dimensions of all electrical components on ship, and information about location of 
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electrical components, as input. The implementation of the method was based on the 
assumption that all electrical components had the shape of a cuboid. A cuboid is a 
rectangular solid. The EPOD value computed for each component is updated in the 
Reconfiguration database during execution of the agent. 
3.4.4 Pre-hit Reconfiguration Agent 
The function of the Pre-hit Reconfiguration agent is to suggest a new configuration 
in which the actual damage that will be caused, by the hit of an incoming weapon, is 
reduced. The Pre-hit Reconfiguration agent is called by the Pre-hit Coordination agent, 
after the Weapon Damage Assessment agent has performed its function. Then this agent 
tries to determine the reconfiguration actions for a new configuration in which the actual 
damage that will be caused, by the hit of an incoming weapon, is reduced. Once the Pre-
hit Reconfiguration agent has performed its function it notifies the Pre-hit Coordination 
agent. The Weapon Damage Assessment agent was implemented using Microsoft Visual 
C++ and Multilogic Exsys Developer. 
The block diagram of Pre-hit Reconfiguration agent is shown in Fig 3.7. It consists 
of two modules – Reconfiguration for Component Isolation module and Reconfiguration 
for Reduction of Supply Interruption module. First the Reconfiguration for Component 
Isolation module is called. This module takes as input the EPOD of electrical 
components, as input, from the Reconfiguration database through the Query agent. Then 
this module determines the components, which have an EPOD value higher than a user 
defined threshold value. Then reconfiguration for isolating these components is 
performed to reduce possible electrical faults and cascading faults. The reconfiguration 
actions for isolating these components are implemented on the pre-hit configuration to 
obtain a new configuration and this configuration is stored in the Reconfiguration 
database. Then the Reconfiguration for Reduction of Supply Interruption module is 
called. This module takes as input the new configuration stored in the Reconfiguration 
database. Then reconfiguration for reduction in supply interruption for vital loads is 
performed. This is done to ensure that vital loads will have a greater chance of 
continuance of supply after the weapon hit. Then the control actions for the new 
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configuration are determined and stored in the Reconfiguration database. This 
information is passed to the Pre-hit Coordination agent by the Pre-hit Reconfiguration 
agent. Details of each of the modules of the Pre-hit Reconfiguration agent are discussed 
in the following subsections. 
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Fig.  3.7: Pre-hit Reconfiguration Agent 
 
3.4.4.1 Reconfiguration for Component Isolation Module 
The function of the Reconfiguration for Component Isolation Module, refer section 
2.2.2.2, is to determine the control actions to isolate components that have a very high 
probability of getting damaged. First, a list of components that have EPOD values 
greater than a user-defined threshold value and lie in radial paths of non-vital loads, are 
determined. These components are referred as non-critical components. Then the control 
actions to isolate these non-critical components are determined. Depending on the extent 
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of the damage due to weapon hit, the number of components in the non-critical 
components list can be large and the methodology to determine the isolation steps for 
each of them can be time consuming. Also it is possible that more than one non-critical 
component can lie on the same radial path. Hence it is possible that isolating one 
upstream non-critical component can lead to isolation of other downstream non-critical 
components.  
For example, as shown in Fig. 3.8, load L1 is receiving electrical supply through a 
radial path R1. Suppose, there are three components in R1 that have EPOD values 
greater than user-defined threshold value. These components are cable CL2, circuit 
breaker CB3, and cable CL1. The non-critical component that is farthest upstream in R1 
is cable CL1. If CL1 is isolated by opening circuit breaker CB1, then this action will 
result in isolation of CL2 and CB3 as well. 
This module takes as input the connectivity information and switch status from 
Reconfiguration database, through Query agent. Then it identifies non-critical 
components and determines the control actions for isolating those components. The 
determined control actions are then stored in Reconfiguration database through Query 
agent. This module was implemented as an Expert System module using Multilogic 
Exsys Developer and Microsoft Visual C++. 
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Fig.  3.8: Radial Supply Path, R1, for Load L1 
 
3.4.4.2 Reconfiguration for Reduction of Supply Interruption Module 
The function of Reconfiguration for Reduction of Supply Interruption Module, refer 
section 2.2.2, is to determine control actions to reduce the probability of supply 
interruption to the vital loads. In this methodology only the vital loads are considered for 
reconfiguration. For each vital load, all paths that can supply electrical power to it are 
determined. Then for each possible path, a Path Availability probability is calculated, 
based on the EPOD values of the electrical components in that path. Path Availability 
probability gives a measure of chance, for a path, to provide electrical energy to the load. 
After the calculation of the Path Availability probability, the path having the best Path 
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Availability probability is selected as path to supply electrical power to that load. If the 
path with the best Path Availability probability is the path supplying power to that load, 
before the weapon hit, then no reconfiguration steps are needed; otherwise the 
reconfiguration steps to energize the load through that path are determined. This 
procedure is repeated for each vital load. This module was implemented in Microsoft 
Visual C++. 
3.4.5 Post-hit Coordination Agent 
The Post-hit Coordination agent is another coordinating agent and its function is to 
coordinates the activities of other agents in order to perform reconfiguration for the 
restoration of SPS, after the incoming weapon has hit the ship. This agent is called when 
the Pre-hit Coordination Agent has achieved its objective. Then this agent starts the 
process of reconfiguration for the restoration of SPS, after the weapon has hit the ship. 
This agent then calls various other agents in order to achieve its objective of suggesting a 
new configuration scheme for load restoration. This agent is also responsible for giving 
as output the list of restorable and un-restorable loads and control actions for restorable 
loads. In the event if load shedding is performed by the Load Shedding agent, discussed 
later in section 3.4.9, then the Post-hit Coordination module also outputs the list of load 
to be shed and the control actions for load shedding. The suggested control actions for 
the new configuration are then given as output to the operator and then its up to the 
operator to implement the suggested control actions. The Post-hit Coordination agent 
was implemented using Microsoft Visual C++. The block diagram of the Post-hit 
Coordination agent is shown in Fig. 3.9.  
Like the Pre-hit Coordination agent, the Post-hit Coordination agent also consists of 
two modules – Database Creation Module and Agent Coordination Module. The 
Database Creation module in this case creates a local database – Restoration database. 
This database is created by the Query agent using the GIS database and the Constraint 
database. This database consists of connectivity and static information for all 
components. It also contains the upper current limit information for all cables, upper and 
lower voltage information for all load nodes and generation capacity constraint 
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information. This database also consists of tables that store results at the intermediary 
results during the execution of the Post-hit Reconfiguration for Restoration method. This 
database is destroyed when the Post-hit Coordination agent achieves its objective. After 
the formation of Restoration database, Agent Coordination module is called. This 
module coordinates the activities of the other agents. It also decides which agent to call, 
at different stages of execution of the Post-hit Restoration.  
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Fig.  3.9: Post-hit Coordination Agent 
 
3.4.6 Failure Assessment Agent 
The function of the failure assessment agent is to detect and locate fault(s) in the 
SPS. It also determines the component in the faulted section and de-energized loads. 
This agent was developed earlier by researchers in PSAL. The Failure Assessment agent 
is called by the Post-hit Coordination agent after the weapon has hit the ship. This agent 
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then tries to detect any abnormal condition in the system. If an abnormal condition is 
detected, then it determines if the abnormal condition represents a fault. If the abnormal 
condition is detected as a fault, then the Failure Assessment agent determines the faulted 
sections in the SPS. Finally it determines the components in the faulted sections and de-
energized loads and gives as output. This information is then stored in the Restoration 
database through the Query agent. The Failure Assessment agent was implemented using 
Multilogic Exsys Developer and Microsoft Visual C++. 
The Failure Assessment agent, shown in Fig 3.10, consists of two modules, Fault 
Detection Module and Fault Location module. The Fault Detection Module utilizes the 
generator frequency, voltage levels at the switchboards and load centers, and current 
measurements at the circuit breakers to determine the presence of a fault or an 
abnormality condition. These values are extracted from GIS database through Query 
agent. The Fault Detection Module then checks whether present current, voltage, and 
frequency measurements are within acceptable levels. If not, then an abnormality is 
detected. If the detected abnormality is identified as the fault, then the Fault Location 
Module is executed. 
The Fault Location Module method utilizes the pre-fault and post-fault CB status, 
pre-fault, fault, and post-fault current measurements, and pre-fault, fault, and post-fault 
voltage measurements at switchboards and load centers. These values are used by 
heuristics based rules to determine the faulted sections and de-energized loads. This 
module takes historical data from the Historical database, frequency, voltage and current 
deviation limits from the Constraint database, and real time data from the GIS database 
to detect abnormalities and identify faulted section(s). These values are obtained through 
the Query agent. Finally, the output of the Failure Assessment agent is a list of 
components in the faulted section and de-energized loads. 
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Fig.  3.10: Failure Assessment Agent 
 
3.4.7 Post-hit Reconfiguration for Restoration Agent 
The function of the Post-hit Reconfiguration for Restoration agent (refer to section 
2.2.3) is to determine reconfiguration control actions for restoring de-energized loads, 
after a weapon has hit a ship. This agent was developed earlier by researchers in PSAL. 
This agent is called by the Post-hit Coordination agent, which provides the information 
regarding components in faulted sections and de-energized loads. The Post-hit 
Restoration agent was implemented using Microstation Exsys Developer and Microsoft 
Visual C++.  
The Post-hit Reconfiguration for Restoration agent, shown in Fig 3.11, consists of 
two modules – Expert System Load Reconfiguration module and Data Flow Control 
module. This Expert System Load Reconfiguring module is an expert system based 
agent whose goal is to determine the control actions for reconfiguring a load. To 
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determine the reconfiguration control actions, the Load Reconfiguring module will 
interact with the Query agent to obtain the system information consisting of various 
static, connectivity and real time data from Restoration database. The de-energized loads 
are ordered on the basis of their load priority (vital, non-vital), by the Load 
Reconfiguring module. Then loads having the same priority are further ordered on the 
basis of their location (switchboard or load center), with loads that are fed directly from 
a switchboard given a higher priority. Loads at the same location are further ordered on 
the basis of their rating, with loads of larger rating given a higher priority. 
 
  
Restoration 
Database 
Reconfiguration steps for 
new configuration   
Expert System Load 
Reconfiguring Module 
Post-hit Reconfiguration for 
Restoration Agent 
Query Agent 
System Analysis 
Agent
Data Flow Control 
Module 
 
 
Fig.  3.11: Post-hit Reconfiguration for Restoration Agent 
 
After ordering the loads, the first load from the priority order list is chosen and the 
Load Reconfiguring module then tries to determine the control actions for a new 
configuration in which that de-energized load is restorable. Once the control actions for 
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a new configuration have been determined, the Post-hit Reconfiguration for Restoration 
agent calls the System Analysis agent to check for constraint violations in the new 
configuration. If there are no violations, then the information to implement the control 
actions for the new configuration is stored in the Restoration database through the Query 
agent. Then the next load from the priority order list is chosen. In case of a constraint 
violation, the load is determined as un-restorable and the next load from the priority 
order list is chosen. The same steps are repeated for the next load. 
Once all the de-energized loads from the priority order list have been considered, 
then Post-hit Reconfiguration for Restoration agent calls the System Analysis agent to 
check for a generation capacity constraint violation. The control actions for load 
shedding and the load(s) to be shed are stored in the Restoration database. After the load 
shedding has been performed, then the System Analysis agent informs the Post-hit 
Reconfiguration for Restoration agent, which then passes the information about the 
restorable and un-restorable loads, control actions for restorable loads, loads to be shed 
(in case of generation capacity constraint violations) and load shedding steps; to the 
Post-hit Coordination agent. In case of a violation, the System Analysis agent calls the 
Load Shedding agent to perform load shedding. Finally, control actions for a new 
configuration will be obtained in which as much de-energized load as possible are 
restorable. The information regarding these control actions is then passed back to the 
Restoration agent. The Data Flow Control module is responsible for interacting with the 
System Analysis agent at different stages of the restoration process. This module decides 
whether the System Analysis agent is to be called to perform current and voltage 
constraint violation checks or to perform generation capacity constraint violation checks. 
3.4.8 System Analysis Agent 
The function of the System Analysis agent is to check for system constraint 
violations. This agent was developed earlier by researchers in PSAL. The System 
Analysis agent is called by the Post-hit Restoration agent. It consists of two modules – 
ATP Simulation module and Constraint Checking module, as shown in Fig. 3.12. First 
the ATP Simulation module is called. This module performs ATP simulation on the 
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configuration of SPS, which is obtained from the Restoration database. Once the ATP 
simulation is performed, then the Constraint Checking module is called to check for a 
constraint violation. Then the System Analysis agent informs the Post-hit Restoration 
agent if there were constraint violations.  
 
 
  
Whether a constraint 
violation was met.   
ATP Simulation 
Module 
System Analysis  
Agent  
Constraints Checking 
Module  
Restoration 
Database   
Query Agent 
 
Fig.  3.12: System Analysis Agent 
 
Details of the two modules of the System Analysis agent are presented in the 
following subsections. 
3.4.8.1 ATP Simulation Module 
This module uses the Alternate Transient Program (ATP) simulation program to 
obtain results similar to that of steady state circuit simulation. The results which are 
output from the ATP simulation, in a binary output file, are current flowing in each cable 
and voltage at each load node. To obtain these results, the ATP circuit simulation is 
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performed until steady state has been reached. The ATP Simulation Module first obtains 
the present configuration from the Restoration database. A configuration is represented 
by the status of various switches in the electrical network. The information about the 
present configuration, i.e., the switch statuses, are then updated in the ATP simulation 
input files. Then this ATP Simulation is preformed using these input files. The 
simulation is performed until steady state has been reached. Then, from the binary output 
file, currents values in all the cables and voltage values at all the load nodes are 
extracted. This module was implemented using the Alternate Transients Program and 
Microsoft Visual C++. 
3.4.8.2 Constraint Checking Module 
The function of this module is to use the current and voltage information, obtained 
from the ATP Simulation module, to check for system constraint violations. This module 
was implemented in Microsoft Visual C++.  
For every cable, an ampacity limit is defined. A cable carrying current greater than 
its ampacity limit can get overheated which can eventually cause damage to the cable 
and can lead to a fault. For the Constraint Checking Module, an upper current limit is 
defined for each cable which was equal to 110% of the ampacity limit for that cable. The 
constraint checks are made for each cable to see if the current flowing through any cable 
is greater than the upper current limit. 
The allowable voltage limits for every load is defined. Voltage outside this range can 
lead to improper functioning or can cause damage to the load. In the Constraint 
Checking module, this voltage range is defined in terms of upper voltage limit and lower 
voltage limit. The upper voltage limit is chosen as 105% of the rated voltage and lower 
voltage is chosen as 95% of the rated voltage value. Constraint checks are made to see 
that if upper or lower voltage constraints are violated at any node.  
A given power system has fixed generation capacity depending on the size of the 
generating units. If the load demand and power losses exceed the available generation 
capacity, then the system is unable to feed electrical energy to all loads. Hence the total 
amount of load fed by the system and power losses in the system is calculated and their 
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sum is compared with the available generation capacity. If the sum is greater than the 
available generation capacity then the generation capacity constraint is said to be 
violated. 
3.4.9 Load Shedding Agent 
The function of the Load Shedding agent is to determine control actions to shed 
loads to meet a given amount of generation deficiency. The Load Shedding agent is 
called by the System Analysis agent, when a generation capacity constraint violation is 
determined. The load shedding agent then obtains status, connectivity and static 
information from the Restoration agent through the Query agent. Then it orders all loads 
in increasing order of priority. Next, it determines the control actions for shedding load 
for a given amount of generation deficiency. This agent was implemented in Multilogic 
Exsys Developer and Microsoft Visual C++. The block diagram of Load Shedding agent 
is shown in Fig 3.13. 
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Fig.  3.13: Load Shedding Agent 
 
The Load Shedding agent consists of two modules – Load Prioritizing module and 
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Load Shedding Steps Module. The Load prioritizing module considers all the loads 
available in the system and then orders them based on a pre-established priority order. 
The method of prioritizing was explained in section 2.3.1.8. After the loads are ordered, 
the Load Shedding Steps Module is executed. This module determines the control 
actions for shedding load(s) to meet the generation deficit. The loads are shed according 
to the priority order to remove the generation capacity constraint. Control actions for 
shedding the load(s) and the load(s) to be shed are then given as an output. This 
information is stored in the Restoration database through the Query agent. 
3.5 SUMMARY 
In this chapter, the implementation details for the Predictive Reconfiguration 
methodology were presented. This methodology was implemented using multi-agent 
technology. A Multi-Agent System (MAS) was developed to implement the Pre-hit 
Probabilistic Reconfiguration method for the SPSs. This MAS also implemented a Post-
hit Restoration method, which was developed earlier at PSAL. Various agents were 
developed to perform specialized tasks. The structure of each of these agents were 
presented and discussed. 
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4 ILLUSTRATION OF PREDICTIVE RECONFIGURATION 
METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
A methodology for Predictive Reconfiguration was developed. The methodology 
was implemented using Multi-Agent technology. A Multi-Agent System for performing 
Predictive Reconfiguration was developed. The MAS was implemented using Microsoft 
Visual C++, Alternate Transient Program [34], Multilogic Exsys Developer [17,18], and 
Microsoft Access. The methodology was applied to a SPS model. This SPS was a 
reduced version of an SPS for a non-nuclear surface combatant ship. 
In this chapter, test cases will be presented to illustrate the effectiveness of the 
methodology applied to a test SPS model. In section 4.2, the details of test SPS model is 
discussed and the database to store the electrical parameters of the test SPS is presented. 
In section 4.3, a complex case is presented to illustrate the MAS. Results of various 
agents will be presented. The effectiveness of the Pre-hit Reconfiguration method will be 
demonstrated. In section 4.4, another complex case is presented. In this case, load 
shedding was required to be performed during Restoration, after the weapon hit. In 
section 4.5 analysis of test results will be presented and conclusions will be drawn. 
4.2 TEST SHIPBOARD POWER SYSTEM (SPS) MODEL 
To investigate the behavior of the power system on a navy ship during fault 
scenarios caused by weapon hits, real field data measurements are required. Since such 
data is not publicly available, simulations have to be performed to generate data for 
various fault scenarios. Transients modeling and simulation for a SPS model was 
developed by researchers at PSAL to investigate the SPS behavior. A test SPS model, 
which represented an AC radial SPS on a non-nuclear surface combatant ship, was 
designed and modeled with the Alternate Transient Program (ATP). This test SPS was a 
reduced version of the actual electrical layout on a ship [14]. The methodology for 
Predictive Reconfiguration was applied to for test the SPS model. The electrical layout 
CHAPTER IV 
ILLUSTRATION OF PREDICTIVE RECONFIGURATION 
ETHODOLOGY 
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for this test SPS is shown in Fig. 4.1. 
This layout consisted of three generators connected in a ring configuration. At any 
given time, only two of the generators were energized and the other served as an 
emergency generator. Each generator was connected to a generator switchboard. The 
circuits downstream of the main switchboards were distributed in a radial configuration. 
The other components of the SPS were load center switchboards, power distribution 
panels, bus transfer (BT) units, transformers, loads, Low Voltage Protection devices 
(LVPs), and Low Voltage Release devices (LVRs), circuit breakers, and interconnecting 
cable used for delivering power to various loads.  
The test SPS model had 3 generator switchboards, 5 load centers switchboards, 2 
power distribution panels, 28 bus transfer units, 11 transformers, 17 LVPs, 2 LVRs, 83 
circuit breakers, 33 single phase loads, 42 three phase loads, 33 single phase cables, and 
112 three phase cables.  
The generators were ungrounded, delta-connected gas turbine synchronous machine, 
and were operated at 60 Hz and 450 V. The rated capacity of each generator was 2.5 
MW with a rated power factor of 0.8 lagging. Load Centers LC11 and LC41 were 
downstream of SB1, LC12 and LC31 were downstream of SB2, and LC42 was 
downstream of SB3. There were nineteen dynamic induction motors and twenty-six 
constant impedance loads fed through main switchboards, load center switchboards or 
power panels. The total power consumption of this system was 3.8 MW. The eleven 
transformers with a ratio 450/120 V in the test SPS, served single phase loads operated 
at 115 V. There were two types of transformers, 3x25 kVA and 3x15 kVA. Each of the 
transformers was a three-phase transformer bank in a delta-delta connection. The three-
phase and single-phase power cables connected various power elements mentioned 
above. 
                                  86 
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Fig.  4.1: Electrical Layout of Test SPS 
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The test SPS model also contained several types of protective devices applied on a 
naval ship. They were circuit breakers with inverse time over current relays, ABT, MBT, 
LVR and LVP. In Fig. 4.1, the symbols  and  denote a closed and open circuit 
breaker, respectively. The symbol  denotes a bus transfer unit, in which  
indicates a closed position, and  indicates an open position. An LVP and an LVR in 
the closed position is denoted by the symbol , and the open position is denoted by 
. These protective devices are shown in Fig. 4.1. The protective devices were 
designed for the protection of SPS in different situations. The circuit breakers for over-
current and short-circuit fault protection, ABT and MBT to provide continuous power 
supply for vital loads, and LVP and LVR to provide low voltage protection for induction 
motors. Ratings and settings of these protective devices were chosen based on 
information from military documents [35,36] and notes from Dr. Butler-Purry, who 
participated in the ONR Scientist to Sea Program (April 28-May 2, 1997 aboard the USS 
Monterey). 
The test SPS model, which was modeled and simulated in ATP, was also modeled 
with the Geographic Information System (GIS) modeling methodology developed by 
researchers at PSAL [33]. A three-dimensional (3D) layout of the example SPS was 
drawn as Microstation SE CADD diagrams [15]. Fig. 4.2 shows an isometric view of the 
SPS model on the ship. The structure of the ship and all components in the SPS model 
were drawn according to their physical sizes and geographic positions. Each element in 
the 3D drawing was linked to one or a set of tables in a database developed in Microsoft 
Access. This database is referred to as GIS database (refer to section 3.4.1).  
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Fig.  4.2: 3D Diagram of the Test SPS on Ship 
 
The GIS database contained one system table, which provided a list of all 
components in the test SPS model. In this system table, names of all components in the 
system, together with their types, geographic positions, and connection status, were 
stored. Connection status in the system table stated whether a component was available 
for system operation.  
As stated earlier in section 3.4.1, in the GIS database, three tables were designed for 
each type of components. These tables were connection table, dynamic table and static 
table. In dynamic tables, real-time measurements for various components were stored. It 
also contained status information for switch type components (e.g. circuit-breakers). 
Also for bus transfers, the dynamic table contained information representing the data 
used by the bus transfer to supply power, via normal path or alternate path. A system 
operator could update data in connection tables and static tables, while data in dynamic 
tables were updated based on the measurements. At a given instant of time, 
configuration of the test SPS model could be determined from system connectivity 
information, the connection status, working status and switch status of various 
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components in the test SPS model.  
A Constraint database and a Historical database were also designed to store 
operation constraints and field measurement data, respectively. The GIS, Constraint and 
Historical databases were global databases. In addition to these global databases, two 
local databases were also developed. These databases were Reconfiguration and 
Restoration databases. The structures of global databases, GIS, Constraint, and 
Historical databases are given in Appendix A.  
Since field measurements on naval ships are not publicly available, simulation 
generated measurements from time-domain ATP simulations results were used in test 
cases presented in this dissertation. The dynamic tables in the GIS database were 
updated with simulation generated measurements at specified time intervals. 
Measurements were also stored in the historical database, as appropriate.  
4.3 ILLUSTRATIVE CASE 
In this section, a scenario is presented to illustrate the Predictive Reconfiguration 
methodology. Results obtained after executing the Predictive Reconfiguration 
Methodology in this scenario, will be presented to show the effectiveness of the 
methodology.  
In this scenario, it was assumed that an incoming missile was detected. The 
probability density function of the weapon hit location and its mean, for that missile, 
were assumed to be known. Thereafter, the Pre-hit Coordination agent was called to 
perform Pre-hit Probabilistic reconfiguration. Then the reconfiguration actions for pre-
hit reconfiguration were determined. After the execution of Pre-hit Probabilistic 
reconfiguration, the Pre-hit Coordination agent passed a command to the Post-hit 
Coordination agent. It was assumed that Pre-hit reconfiguration actions were 
implemented on the test SPS, before the weapon-hit occurred. Also, it was assumed that 
the actual hit location was determined, after the missile hit the ship. 
In the real weapon hit situation, protective devices will operate to isolate the faulted 
sections created due to the damage caused by the weapon hit. A failure assessment 
program will then use the status of the protective devices to detect and locate the fault(s) 
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caused due to the weapon hit. In order to execute the Post-hit Restoration method real-
time data are required. Since real time data are not available, simulation generated 
measurements were used to obtain post-fault configuration. In order to generate these 
measurements, first, the actual damaged components after the weapon hit were 
determined using the cookie-cutter approach. In using the cookie-cutter approach, a 
lethal radius must be assumed. All the electrical components lying inside the damage 
sphere, defined by the lethal radius around the actual hit location, were then assumed to 
be damaged. This is shown in Fig. 4.3 for a particular damage scenario. In this figure, a 
lethal radius of R was assumed. The damage sphere for that lethal radius is shown. The 
portions of the components C1214, C1213, C1105, C2312, and C2303 are inside of the 
damage sphere. So using cookie-cutter approach the damaged components can be 
identified. The damage to the electrical components, except circuit breakers, was then 
simulated as three-phase solid faults in the ATP simulation input files for the test SPS 
model. For circuit breakers, the damage was simulated as an open circuit situation 
(details are in section 2.2.2.1) in the ATP simulation input files.  
 
C1105
C1213
C1214
C2312 C2303
R
 
Fig.  4.3: Cookie Cutter Approach 
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The ATP simulation was then performed to generate the measurements. The results 
of the ATP simulation were used to update the GIS database and Historical database to 
provide the initial data required to perform the post-hit restoration. In actual operation of 
the Predictive Reconfiguration method, the GIS database and the Historical database 
would be updated with real time measurements from the ship. The Post-hit Coordination 
agent then performed the post-hit restoration and determined the restoration control 
actions. This completed the process of Predictive Reconfiguration methodology. 
To test the effectiveness of the Predictive Reconfiguration methodology, for the test 
case mentioned above, restoration control actions were also determined assuming that 
pre-hit reconfiguration was not applied to the test SPS model. This process in which 
post-hit reconfiguration restoration was applied without determining the reconfiguration 
actions from Pre-hit Probabilistic Reconfiguration, will be simply referred to as 
Restoration process. Four random locations on the ship model were chosen as location of 
weapon hits. These locations were chosen by assuming a miss distance for a missile. For 
each of these scenarios, post-hit reconfiguration for restoration was performed twice. 
One scenario in which the assumption that pre-hit reconfiguration was applied and the 
other scenario in which the assumption that pre-hit reconfiguration was not performed. 
The results of each of these cases will be presented and compared to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of the Predictive Reconfiguration methodology.   
4.3.1 Scenario 
In the scenario, it was assumed that an incoming missile was detected by the weapon 
detection technology existing on a ship. As stated earlier in section 2.2.1.4, the 
probability density function of the weapon hit location is an input to Predictive 
Reconfiguration method. This probability density function, as defined in (2.6) in section 
2.2.1.4, is given below as (4.1).  
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
ezyxp
zyx zyx
2
222
2
32
3
2
1,, σ
µµµ
σπ
−+−+−−=  (4.1) 
 
For this scenario, the means ( )zyx µµµ ,, , were given as (285,40,6), respectively. 
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Also the standard deviation σ  was given as 5. Further as stated earlier in section 2.2.1.4, 
the function that describes the probability of kill for a point at a given distance from the 
location of the actual hit is given This function, as defined in (2.9) in section 2.2.1.4, is 
given below as (4.2). 
( ) ( )ezyxF zyx 20222 2,, σ++−=  (4.2) 
 
For this scenario, the effectiveness factor, 0σ , was given as 15. Further this scenario 
investigates four cases with randomly chosen hit locations. These cases represented 
different miss distances for the missile. The four hit locations are given below. 
 
Hit location 1 
In this situation, the coordinates for hit location were chosen as (285,35,-4). The miss 
distance with respect to the predicted hit location in this case was 11.2 feet.  
 
Hit location 2 
In this situation the coordinates for hit location were chosen as (290,45,-3). The miss 
distance with respect to the predicted hit location in this case was 11.5 feet.  
 
Hit location 3 
In this situation the coordinates for hit location were chosen as (295,50,3). The miss 
distance with respect to the predicted hit location in this case was 14.5 feet. 
 
Hit location 4 
In this situation the coordinates for hit location were chosen as (273,35,-7). The miss 
distance with respect to the predicted hit location in this case was 18.4 feet.  
4.3.2  Pre-hit Probabilistic Reconfiguration 
Using the input data stated in the previous section, the Pre-hit Coordination agent is 
called to perform Pre-hit Probabilistic Reconfiguration and determine reconfiguration 
control actions. The Pre-hit Reconfiguration agent, first, called the Query agent and sent 
instructions leading to the formation of the Reconfiguration database. This database, as 
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explained earlier in section 3.4.1, consists of tables created using the GIS database. After 
the formation of the Reconfiguration database, the Pre-hit Reconfiguration agent then 
called the Weapon Damage Assessment agent to compute the EPOD for each electrical 
component in the test SPS model.  
The Weapon Damage Assessment agent computed the EPODs for all the electrical 
components in the test SPS model, for the given values of σ  and 0σ . The information 
about the location of various components and their dimensions was obtained from the 
Reconfiguration database through the Query agent. The results of the Weapon damage 
Assessment agent are shown in Table 4.1. This table gives the computed EPODs for all 
the electrical components in the test SPS model. These results were stored in the 
Reconfiguration database by passing proper instructions to Query agent. 
 
Table 4.1 
Results of the Weapon Damage Assessment Agent 
Name Type EPOD 
ABT1 BT 0 
ABT10 BT 0 
ABT11 BT 0.490387 
ABT12 BT 0.000149 
ABT14 BT 0.000007 
ABT15 BT 0.130425 
ABT16 BT 0 
ABT2 BT 0 
ABT3 BT 0.052292 
ABT4 BT 0.149745 
ABT5 BT 0.00037 
ABT6 BT 0.000001 
ABT7 BT 0 
ABT8 BT 0 
ABT9 BT 0 
MBT1 BT 0 
MBT2 BT 0.024921 
MBT3 BT 0.000174 
MBT4 BT 0.000001 
MBT5 BT 0 
MBT6 BT 0 
MBT7 BT 0.01972 
MBT8 BT 0 
MBT9 BT 0 
ML1 BT 0.000027 
ML2 BT 0.00002 
ML3 BT 0 
ML4 BT 0 
C0110AB CABLE 0 
C0110BC CABLE 0 
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Table 4.1 continued 
Name Type EPOD 
C0110CA CABLE 0 
C0112AB CABLE 0 
C0112BC CABLE 0 
C0112CA CABLE 0 
C0115AB CABLE 0.621886 
C0115BC CABLE 0.693365 
C0115CA CABLE 0.652856 
C0116AB CABLE 0 
C0116BC CABLE 0 
C0116CA CABLE 0 
C0201AB CABLE 0.231896 
C0201BC CABLE 0.231896 
C0201CA CABLE 0.202482 
C0205AB CABLE 0.635424 
C0205BC CABLE 0.609508 
C0205CA CABLE 0.582316 
C0210AB CABLE 0 
C0210BC CABLE 0 
C0210CA CABLE 0 
C0211AB CABLE 0 
C0211BC CABLE 0 
C0211CA CABLE 0 
C0213AB CABLE 0.231896 
C0213BC CABLE 0.222439 
C0213CA CABLE 0.212515 
C0302AB CABLE 0 
C0302BC CABLE 0 
C0302CA CABLE 0 
C0303AB CABLE 0 
C0303BC CABLE 0 
C0303CA CABLE 0 
C1100 CABLE 0 
C1101 CABLE 0.000025 
C1102 CABLE 0.062035 
C1103 CABLE 0.000128 
C1104 CABLE 0.000023 
C1105 CABLE 0 
C1106 CABLE 0.000008 
C1107 CABLE 0 
C1108 CABLE 0.000017 
C1109 CABLE 0.015043 
C1110 CABLE 0 
C1111 CABLE 0 
C1112 CABLE 0 
C1113 CABLE 0 
C1114 CABLE 0.848382 
C1115 CABLE 0.746452 
C1116 CABLE 0.014781 
C1117 CABLE 0.848382 
C1118 CABLE 0.000434 
C1119 CABLE 0.000341 
C1120 CABLE 0.023145 
C1200 CABLE 0.062134 
C1201 CABLE 0.179046 
C1202 CABLE 0.062277 
C1203 CABLE 0.120409 
C1204 CABLE 0.111196 
C1205 CABLE 0.731935 
C1206 CABLE 0.183316 
C1207 CABLE 0.012307 
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Table 4.1 continued 
Name Type EPOD 
C1208 CABLE 0 
C1209 CABLE 0 
C1210 CABLE 0 
C1211 CABLE 0 
C1212 CABLE 0 
C1213 CABLE 0.275418 
C1214 CABLE 0.500064 
C1215 CABLE 0 
C1216 CABLE 0 
C1300 CABLE 0 
C1301 CABLE 0 
C1302 CABLE 0 
C1303 CABLE 0.672443 
C1304 CABLE 0 
C1305 CABLE 0.579301 
C1306 CABLE 0 
C1307 CABLE 0.000005 
C1308 CABLE 0 
C1309 CABLE 0 
C1310 CABLE 0.848382 
C1311 CABLE 0.848382 
C1312 CABLE 0.475958 
C1313 CABLE 0.475959 
C1314 CABLE 0 
C1412 CABLE 0.09767 
C1413 CABLE 0.09767 
C1423 CABLE 0.043886 
C2101 CABLE 0.160196 
C2102 CABLE 0.142407 
C2103 CABLE 0.126089 
C2106 CABLE 0.179486 
C2107 CABLE 0.074455 
C2108 CABLE 0.064617 
C2110 CABLE 0 
C2113 CABLE 0 
C2114 CABLE 0 
C2115 CABLE 0.746452 
C2117 CABLE 0.047579 
C2120 CABLE 0.179486 
C2203 CABLE 0.120409 
C2203 CABLE 0.120409 
C2206 CABLE 0.183316 
C2207 CABLE 0.064617 
C2208 CABLE 0 
C2209 CABLE 0 
C2211 CABLE 0 
C2212 CABLE 0 
C2303 CABLE 0 
C2304 CABLE 0 
C2306 CABLE 0.025098 
C2307 CABLE 0.000004 
C2308 CABLE 0 
C2309 CABLE 0.111196 
C2312 CABLE 0.014781 
C2313 CABLE 0.000002 
C2314 CABLE 0.0408 
C3101 CABLE 0.000095 
C3102 CABLE 0.063784 
C3103 CABLE 0.000211 
C3106 CABLE 0.00001 
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Table 4.1 continued 
Name Type EPOD 
C3107 CABLE 0 
C3108 CABLE 0.00012 
C3110 CABLE 0 
C3113 CABLE 0 
C3114 CABLE 0 
C3115 CABLE 0.62934 
C3117 CABLE 0.076259 
C3120 CABLE 0.040275 
C3203 CABLE 0.131851 
C3206 CABLE 0.222627 
C3207 CABLE 0.118965 
C3208 CABLE 0 
C3209 CABLE 0 
C3211 CABLE 0 
C3212 CABLE 0 
C3303 CABLE 0 
C3304 CABLE 0 
C3306 CABLE 0 
C3307 CABLE 0.00013 
C3308 CABLE 0 
C3309 CABLE 0 
C3312 CABLE 0.000144 
C3313 CABLE 0.000001 
C3314 CABLE 0 
CBGE01 CB 0 
CBGE02 CB 0.07512 
CBGE03 CB 0 
CBLC1101 CB 0 
CBLC1102 CB 0 
CBLC1103 CB 0 
CBLC1104 CB 0 
CBLC1105 CB 0 
CBLC1106 CB 0 
CBLC1107 CB 0 
CBLC1201 CB 0 
CBLC1202 CB 0 
CBLC1203 CB 0 
CBLC1205 CB 0 
CBLC1207 CB 0 
CBLC3101 CB 0 
CBLC3102 CB 0 
CBLC3103 CB 0 
CBLC3104 CB 0 
CBLC3105 CB 0 
CBLC3106 CB 0 
CBLC3107 CB 0 
CBLC4103 CB 0.013511 
CBLC4104 CB 0.015234 
CBLC4105 CB 0.012982 
CBLC4106 CB 0.014462 
CBLC4107 CB 0.014873 
CBLC4201 CB 0.395255 
CBLC4202 CB 0.411385 
CBLC4203 CB 0.440333 
CBLC4204 CB 0.452836 
CBLC4205 CB 0.463836 
CBSB0101 CB 0 
CBSB0102 CB 0 
CBSB0103 CB 0 
CBSB0104 CB 0 
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Table 4.1 continued 
Name Type EPOD 
CBSB0105 CB 0 
CBSB0106 CB 0 
CBSB0107 CB 0 
CBSB0108 CB 0 
CBSB0109 CB 0 
CBSB0110 CB 0 
CBSB0112 CB 0 
CBSB0113 CB 0 
CBSB0114 CB 0 
CBSB0115 CB 0 
CBSB0116 CB 0 
CBSB0117 CB 0 
CBSB0201 CB 0.055009 
CBSB0202 CB 0.083228 
CBSB0203 CB 0.07441 
CBSB0204 CB 0.06626 
CBSB0205 CB 0.058768 
CBSB0206 CB 0.022056 
CBSB0207 CB 0.064173 
CBSB0208 CB 0.040028 
CBSB0209 CB 0.051914 
CBSB0210 CB 0.019484 
CBSB0211 CB 0.033435 
CBSB0212 CB 0.034939 
CBSB0213 CB 0.015023 
CBSB0214 CB 0.030374 
CBSB0215 CB 0.013113 
CBSB0216 CB 0.026301 
CBSB0217 CB 0.050194 
CBSB0218 CB 0.09272 
CBSB0219 CB 0.042674 
CBSB0301 CB 0 
CBSB0302 CB 0 
CBSB0303 CB 0 
CBSB0304 CB 0 
CBSB0305 CB 0 
CBSB0306 CB 0 
CBSB0307 CB 0 
CBSB0308 CB 0 
CBSB0309 CB 0 
CBSB0310 CB 0 
CBSB0311 CB 0 
CBSB0312 CB 0 
CBSB0313 CB 0 
CBSB0314 CB 0 
CBSB0315 CB 0 
CBSB0317 CB 0 
GEN1 GEN 0 
GEN2 GEN 0.111284 
GEN3 GEN 0 
LC11 LC 0 
LC12 LC 0 
LC31 LC 0 
LC41 LC 0.015917 
LC42 LC 0.458246 
AcCprsr1 LOAD 0.0002 
AcCprsr2 LOAD 0.000243 
AcCprsr3 LOAD 0 
AcCprsr4 LOAD 0 
Anchor LOAD 0 
  98 
  
Table 4.1 continued 
Name Type EPOD 
Cmsry LOAD 0.000067 
Conv1 LOAD 0.071824 
Conv2 LOAD 0 
Elex1AB LOAD 0 
Elex1BC LOAD 0 
Elex1CA LOAD 0 
Elex2 LOAD 0.057519 
Elex3 LOAD 0.000201 
Elex4 LOAD 0.000001 
Frpmp1 LOAD 0 
Frpmp2 LOAD 0 
Frpmp3 LOAD 0.000193 
Frpmp4 LOAD 0.058584 
Frpmp5 LOAD 0.029918 
Frpmp6 LOAD 0.00004 
Frz1 LOAD 0.000011 
Frz2 LOAD 0.142169 
Frz3 LOAD 0 
Galley1 LOAD 0.706901 
Galley2 LOAD 0.681223 
HpCprsr1 LOAD 0.000024 
HpCprsr2 LOAD 0 
LCP10AB LOAD 0.525316 
LCP10BC LOAD 0.569068 
LCP10CA LOAD 0.611552 
LCP1AB LOAD 0.527192 
LCP1BC LOAD 0.551458 
LCP1CA LOAD 0.572244 
LCP2AB LOAD 0.223311 
LCP2BC LOAD 0.231034 
LCP2CA LOAD 0.213485 
LCP3AB LOAD 0 
LCP3BC LOAD 0 
LCP3CA LOAD 0 
LCP4AB LOAD 0 
LCP4BC LOAD 0 
LCP4CA LOAD 0 
LCP5AB LOAD 0 
LCP5BC LOAD 0 
LCP5CA LOAD 0 
LCP6AB LOAD 0.147189 
LCP6BC LOAD 0.165624 
LCP6CA LOAD 0.184882 
LCP7AB LOAD 0 
LCP7BC LOAD 0 
LCP7CA LOAD 0 
LCP8AB LOAD 0 
LCP8BC LOAD 0 
LCP8CA LOAD 0 
LCP9AB LOAD 0 
LCP9BC LOAD 0 
LCP9CA LOAD 0 
Sonar LOAD 0 
Steer1 LOAD 0 
Steer2 LOAD 0 
Torpedo LOAD 0 
Wtrpmp1 LOAD 0.000598 
Wtrpmp2 LOAD 0.00044 
Wtrpmp4 LOAD 0 
LVPAcp1 LVPR 0.000035 
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Table 4.1 continued 
Name Type EPOD 
LVPAcp2 LVPR 0.000045 
LVPAcp3 LVPR 0 
LVPAcp4 LVPR 0 
LVPAnchor LVPR 0 
LVPFpm1 LVPR 0 
LVPFpm2 LVPR 0 
LVPFpm3 LVPR 0.000152 
LVPFpm4 LVPR 0.044349 
LVPFpm5 LVPR 0.026209 
LVPFpm6 LVPR 0.000021 
LVPHpc1 LVPR 0.000037 
LVPHpc2 LVPR 0 
LVPWpm1 LVPR 0.000348 
LVPWpm2 LVPR 0.000477 
LVPWpm3 LVPR 0 
LVPWpm4 LVPR 0 
LVRStr1 LVPR 0 
LVRStr2 LVPR 0 
PP1 PP 0.000237 
PP2 PP 0 
SB1 SB 0 
SB3 SB 0 
Xfmr1 XFMR 0.6328 
Xfmr10 XFMR 0.684452 
Xfmr11 XFMR 0 
Xfmr2 XFMR 0.179597 
Xfmr3 XFMR 0 
Xfmr4 XFMR 0 
Xfmr5 XFMR 0 
Xfmr6 XFMR 0.24413 
Xfmr7 XFMR 0 
Xfmr8 XFMR 0 
Xfmr9 XFMR 0 
 
After the computation of EPODs for all electrical components, the Pre-hit 
Reconfiguration agent called the Pre-hit Probabilistic Reconfiguration agent to 
determine the pre-hit reconfiguration control actions. The Pre-hit Probabilistic 
Reconfiguration agent first called the RCI module to determine the reconfiguration 
control actions for isolating the non-critical components, refer to section 2.2.2.2. For this 
test case, it was assumed that for the RCI module, the operator chose the threshold value 
for the expected probability of damage as 0.5.  The RCI module then determined the 
components that have EPOD greater than the threshold value. These components are 
shown in bold letters in table 4.1.  
The RCI module then obtained the information about the present configuration from 
the Reconfiguration database through the Query agent. The RCI module determined the 
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control actions for isolating the non-critical components among the components 
highlighted in Table 4.1. These non-critical components are along the radial path of 
some non-vital loads. The control actions that will isolate the non-critical components 
along with the non-vital loads are shown in Table 4.2. The PAP values for the radial path 
supplying power to each non-vital load are given as a probability measure, along with 
the suggested control actions. These control actions were then updated in the 
Reconfiguration database by calling the Query agent to change the status and positions 
of various switches and BTs according to the determined control actions.   
 
Table 4.2 
Reconfiguration Actions Determined by RCI Module 
Non vital 
load 
Non-critical component with 
EPOD > EPODthreshold 
Control actions 
for non-vital loads PAP 
Galley1 C1305 Open CBSB0305 0.011136 
Galley2 C1305 Open CBSB0305 0.011969 
LCP1AB C1205 Open CBSB0206 0.016593 
LCP1BC C1205 Open CBSB0206 0.016861 
LCP1CA C1205 Open CBSB0206 0.017199 
Cmsry C1214 Open CBLC1207 0.50064 
 
After the determination of the control actions for isolating the components, the Pre-
hit Probabilistic agent then called the RRSI module to determine the control actions for 
reducing the possibility of supply interruption to the vital loads, refer to section 2.2.2.3. 
As explained earlier, in section 2.2.2.3, the RRSI module can have different outputs 
depending upon which control actions, determined by RCI module, are selected for 
implementation. In this test case, the RCI module determined two different control 
actions as shown in Table 4.2. Out of these two control actions, the control action to 
open CBSB0305 can affect the output of RRSI module as it will cause interruption of 
electrical energy to vital loads Elex3 and Elex4. The control action to open CBSB0206 
does not affect the electrical supply to any vital load and hence it does not have any 
influence on the determination of control actions by the RRSI module. In this test case, 
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the RRSI module had two possible outputs depending upon whether the control action to 
open CBSB0305 was selected for implementation. Tables 4.3 and 4.4 shows the outputs 
of the RRSI module for these two cases, respectively. These tables show the 
reconfiguration control actions for some of the vital loads. These tables also show the 
PAP values of the best path and PAP difference, for each control action as a probability 
measure for that control action. These actions were then updated in the Reconfiguration 
database by calling the Query agent. 
 
Table 4.3 
Reconfiguration Actions Determined by RRSI Module When Control Action to “Open CBSB0305” Is 
Selected by the Operator 
Vital loads Control actions for vital loads PAPbest path PAP difference 
Elex1AB Transfer MBT1 1.0 0.672443 
Elex1BC Transfer MBT1 1.0 0.672443 
Elex1CA Transfer MBT1 1.0 0.672443 
Elex3 Transfer MBT3 0.955119 0.955119 
Torpedo Transfer MBT6 1.0 0.852601 
Elex2 Transfer MBT2 0.776158 0.651269 
AcCprsr4 Transfer ML4 1.0 0.122453 
Frpmp1 Open CBLC1203 1.0 0.128513 
Frpmp4 Open CBSB0213 0.485639 0.007296 
Frz2 Open CBSB0209 0.569618 0.029571 
LCP8AB Open CBLC3107 1.0 0.122453 
LCP8BC Open CBLC3107 1.0 0.122453 
LCP8CA Open CBLC3107 1.0 0.122453 
Wtrpmp3 Transfer MBT9 1.0 0.122453 
Wtrpmp4 Transfer MBT9 1.0 0.122453 
 
Table 4.4 
Reconfiguration Actions Determined by RRSI Module When Control Action to “Open CBSB0305” Is Not 
Selected by the Operator 
Vital loads Control actions for vital loads PAPbest path PAP difference 
Elex1AB Transfer MBT1 1.0 0.672443 
Elex1BC Transfer MBT1 1.0 0.672443 
Elex1CA Transfer MBT1 1.0 0.672443 
Elex3 Transfer MBT3 0.955119 0.831797 
Elex4 Open CBLC4204 0.999995 0.879366 
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Table 4.4 continued 
Vital loads Control actions for vital loads PAPbest path PAP difference 
Torpedo Transfer MBT6 1.0 0.852601 
Elex2 Transfer MBT2 0.776158 0.651269 
AcCprsr4 Transfer ML4 1.0 0.122453 
Frpmp1 Open CBLC1203 1.0 0.128513 
Frpmp4 Open CBSB0213 0.485639 0.007296 
Frz2 Open CBSB0209 0.569618 0.029571 
LCP8AB Open CBLC3107 1.0 0.122453 
LCP8BC Open CBLC3107 1.0 0.122453 
LCP8CA Open CBLC3107 1.0 0.122453 
Wtrpmp3 Transfer MBT9 1.0 0.122453 
Wtrpmp4 Transfer MBT9 1.0 0.122453 
 
Once the Pre-hit Probabilistic Reconfiguration agent completed its execution, then it 
informed Pre-hit Coordination agent. The Pre-hit Coordination agent then called the 
System Analysis agent to check for system constraint violations for each of the two 
cases. The System Analysis agent did not compute constraint violations for the 
reconfiguration control actions and notified Pre-hit Coordination agent. The Pre-hit 
Coordination agent then called the Query agent to obtain the results of the Pre-hit 
Probabilistic agent from the Reconfiguration database. Then the Pre-hit Coordination 
agent used these results, control actions determined by the RCI and RRSI modules, to 
suggest the control actions for pre-hit reconfiguration. The Pre-hit Coordination agent 
suggested two sets of outputs for the two cases in which the control actions were and 
were not implemented to open CBSB0305. These outputs are shown in Table 4.5 and 
Table 4.6, respectively. Since each control action was obtained with respect to either a 
vital or a non-vital load, the probabilistic information such as PAP and PAP difference, 
computed for a load can be outputted along with control action for that load, as shown in 
tables 4.5 and Table 4.6. These tables also give the loads that will be de-energized if the 
suggested control action was implemented. 
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Table 4.5 
Reconfiguration Actions Determined by the Pre-hit Reconfiguration Agent When Control Action to “Open 
CBSB0305” Is Selected by the Operator 
 
Probabilistic information attached with each 
control action 
Vital load Control actions PAP of radial path 
supplying power to the 
non vital load PAPbest path
PAP 
difference 
De-energized loads 
Open CBSB0305 0.011136 - - Galley1, Galley2 
Open CBSB0206 0.016593 - - LCP1AB, LCP1BC, LCP1CA 
Open CBLC1207 0.010672 - - Cmsry 
Transfer MBT1 - 1.0 0.672443 - 
Transfer MBT3 - 0.955119 0.831797 - 
Transfer MBT6 - 1.0 0.852601 - 
Transfer MBT2 - 0.776158 0.651269 - 
Transfer ML4 - 1.0 0.122453 - 
Open CBLC1203 - 1.0 0.128513 - 
Open CBSB0213 - 0.485639 0.007296 - 
Open CBSB0209 - 0.569618 0.029571 - 
Open CBLC3107 - 1.0 0.122453 - 
Transfer MBT9 - 1.0 0.122453 - 
 
Table 4.6 
Reconfiguration Actions Determined by the Pre-hit Reconfiguration Agent When Control Action to “Open 
CBSB0305” Is Not Selected by the Operator 
 
Probabilistic information attached with each 
control action 
Vital load Control actions PAP of radial path 
supplying power to the 
non vital load PAPbest path
PAP 
difference 
De-energized loads 
Open CBSB0206 0.016593 - - LCP1AB, LCP1BC, LCP1CA 
Open CBLC1207 0.010672 - - Cmsry 
Transfer MBT1 - 1.0 0.672443 - 
Transfer MBT3 - 0.955119 0.831797 - 
Open CBLC4204 - 0.999995 0.879366 - 
Transfer MBT6 - 1.0 0.852601 - 
Transfer MBT2 - 0.776158 0.651269 - 
Transfer ML4 - 1.0 0.122453 - 
Open CBLC1203 - 1.0 0.128513 - 
Open CBSB0213 - 0.485639 0.007296 - 
Open CBSB0209 - 0.569618 0.029571 - 
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Table 4.6 continued 
 
Probabilistic information attached with each 
control action 
Vital load Control actions PAP of radial path 
supplying power to the 
non vital load PAPbest path
PAP 
difference 
De-energized loads 
Open CBLC3107 - 1.0 0.122453 - 
Transfer MBT9 - 1.0 0.122453 - 
 
A low value of PAP, for a control action for a non-vital load, means that the radial 
path affected by that control action has a low probability of surviving the weapon hit. In 
this scenario, it has been assumed that for the non vital loads the reconfiguration actions 
that has PAP<0.2 were implemented. This means that the control action to open 
CBSB0305 was therefore selected for implementation. For a vital load, a high PAP 
difference along with a high PAPbest path means that the load has high probability of 
surviving the attack if the control actions are implemented. In this scenario, it was 
assumed that for the vital loads the reconfiguration actions were implemented when 
PAPbest path>0.6 and PAP difference>0.5. The control actions that were implemented are 
shown in bold text in Table 4.5. The control actions were then updated in the 
Reconfiguration database. 
4.3.3 Post-hit Reconfiguration for Restoration with Pre-hit Reconfiguration 
Once a weapon hits the ship, it will destroy some sections of the ship. The power 
network in those sections will also be damaged, leading to faults in the SPS. It is 
assumed in the test case presented in this dissertation that after the implementation of the 
reconfiguration actions suggested by the Pre-hit Coordination agent, the test SPS model 
was hit by a weapon. The Pre-hit Coordination agent then passed the command to the 
Post-hit Reconfiguration for Restoration agent to start the process of reconfiguration for 
restoration.  
The damaged components were identified using a cookie cutter approach. In this test 
case, a lethal radius of 15 feet was chosen. Then the simulation generated measurements 
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were generated by performing the ATP simulation, and stored in the GIS and Historical 
databases. The Post-hit Coordination agent then called the Failure Assessment agent. 
This agent then interacted with the Query agent to obtain data from the GIS, Historical 
and Constraint databases, to detect the fault(s), locate the faulted sections, and determine 
de-energized loads in the test SPS model.  
The Post-hit Coordination agent called the Query agent to create the Restoration 
database. The information, about the components in the faulted sections and the de-
energized loads, were then stored in the Restoration database through the Query agent. 
 The Post-hit Coordination agent then called the Post-hit Reconfiguration for 
Restoration agent to determine reconfiguration control actions for the de-energized 
loads. The Post-hit Reconfiguration for Restoration agent interacted with the Query 
agent, to obtain data from the Restoration database, and determine the reconfiguration 
control actions for each de-energized load. Also, after the determination of the 
reconfiguration actions for a de-energized load, the Post-hit Reconfiguration for 
Restoration agent called the System Analysis module to check for voltage or current 
constraint violations. If there were no violations, then the load was considered restored; 
otherwise it was considered unrestorable. While checking for constraints, the System 
Analysis agent interacted with the Query agent to obtain constraint information for the 
cables and the load nodes from the Constraint database.  
The Post-hit Reconfiguration for Restoration agent stored the information regarding 
the restorable and unrestorable loads in the Restoration database through the Query 
agent. Once all the de-energized loads in the list have been considered, the Post-hit 
Restoration agent called the System Analysis agent to check for power constraint 
violations. If a constraint violation was determined, then the Load Shedding agent was 
called to perform load shedding. The control actions for load shedding were stored in the 
Restoration database, by the Load Shedding agent, through the Query agent. Together 
reconfiguration control actions for each restorable load and control actions to perform 
load shedding form the total reconfiguration actions required for the reconfiguration for 
restoration of the test SPS model. The completion of reconfiguration for restoration 
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process was conveyed to the Post-hit Coordination agent by the Post-hit Reconfiguration 
for Restoration agent. The Post-hit Coordination agent then gave as an output, the list of 
restorable and unrestorable loads along with the reconfiguration actions for restoring the 
restorable loads. 
As stated earlier, this scenario investigates four cases with randomly chosen hit 
locations. For each of these cases, the Post-hit Coordination agent performed post-hit 
restoration. In each of these cases, the interaction between various agents during the 
reconfiguration for restoration process was the same, as explained earlier in this section. 
For each case, ATP simulation was performed for 1.2 seconds. For each damaged 
component, except circuit breakers, simultaneous three-phase solid faults on the system 
were staged at 0.6 sec, after the beginning of the simulation. The results from various 
agents for each case are presented below.  
4.3.3.1 Hit at Randomly Selected Location 1 
The missile hit location was randomly chosen as (285,35,-4). In this case, the 
damaged components obtained by the cookie-cutter method explained earlier are shown 
in Table 4.7. 
 
Table 4.7 
Damaged Components Obtained by the Cookie-Cutter Approach for Hit at (285,35,-4) 
Damaged Components Component type 
C1205, C1303, C1305, 
C0205AB, C0205BC, 
C0205CA 
Cable 
LCP1AB, LCP1BC, 
LCP1CA, Galley1, 
Galley2 
Load 
Xfmr1 Transformer 
 
 The results of the Failure Assessment agent, in this case, are shown in the Table 4.8. 
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Table 4.8 
Results of the Failure Assessment Agent for Hit at (285,35,-4) 
Components in Faulted Sections Component type De-energized loads 
C1303 Cable - 
 
In this case, cable C1303 was identified as components in the faulted section by the 
Failure Assessment agent. Due to the control actions, implemented by the Pre-hit 
Reconfiguration agent, many of the faults were prevented, which would have occurred if 
no pre-hit reconfiguration was performed. The reconfiguration control actions 
implemented during the pre-hit reconfiguration process isolated some sections of the 
electrical system, leading to de-energization of some loads. These loads are shown in 
Table 4.5. Since these loads have already been isolated before the Post-hit Coordination 
Agent is called so for the Post-hit Coordination agent these loads are not part of the 
present configuration. Therefore when the Failure Assessment agent was called, it did 
not identify these loads as de-energized loads, as they are not part of the present 
configuration. After the execution of the Failure Assessment agent, the Post-hit 
Coordination agent called the Post-hit Reconfiguration for Restoration agent. In this 
case, it tried to restore the load de-energized due to control actions in pre-hit 
reconfiguration process. The results of the Post hit Reconfiguration for Restoration agent 
and the System Analysis agent, for this case, are shown in Table 4.9. In this case, no 
system constraint violations were found by System Analysis agent. 
 
Table 4.9 
Results of Post-hit Reconfiguration for Restoration Agent and System Analysis Agent for Hit at  
(285,35,-4) 
Output of Post-hit Reconfiguration 
for Restoration agent Output of System Analysis agent De-energized 
Load Is 
Reconfigurable? 
Reconfiguration 
actions 
Constraint 
Violated? 
Description of 
constraint violation 
Galley1 No - - - 
Galley2 No - - - 
LCP1AB No - - - 
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Table 4.9 continued 
Output of Post-hit Reconfiguration 
for Restoration agent Output of System Analysis agent De-energized 
Load Is 
Reconfigurable? 
Reconfiguration 
actions 
Constraint 
Violated? 
Description of 
constraint violation 
LCP1BC No - - - 
LCP1CA No - - - 
Cmsry Yes Close CBLC1207 No - 
 
Finally, the results of the Post-hit Coordination agent are given in the Table 4.10. 
 
Table 4.10 
Results of Post-hit Coordination Agent for Actual Hit at (285,35,-4) 
De-energized 
Load 
Restorable 
or 
Unrestorable 
Suggested 
reconfiguration 
actions for 
restorable loads 
Reason for load being 
Unrestored 
Galley1 Unrestorable - No reconfigurable path 
Galley2 Unrestorable - No reconfigurable path 
LCP1AB Unrestorable - No reconfigurable path 
LCP1BC Unrestorable - No reconfigurable path 
LCP1CA Unrestorable - No reconfigurable path 
Cmsry Restorable Close CBLC1207 - 
 
4.3.3.2 Hit at Randomly Selected Location 2 
The missile hit location was randomly chosen as (290,45,-3). In this case, the 
damaged components obtained by the cookie-cutter method explained earlier are shown 
in Table 4.11. 
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Table 4.11 
Damaged Components Obtained by the Cookie-Cutter Approach for Hit at (290,45,-3) 
Damaged Components Component type 
C1114, C1117, C1205, 
C1310, C1311, 
C0205AB, C0205BC, 
C0205CA, C1214 
Cable 
LCP1AB, LCP1BC, 
LCP1CA, Galley1, 
Galley2 
Load 
Xfmr1 Transformer 
 
The results of the Failure Assessment agent, in this case, are shown in the Table 
4.12. 
 
Table 4.12 
Results of the Failure Assessment Agent for Hit at (290,45,-3) 
Components in 
Faulted Sections Component type De-energized loads 
C1114, C1117 Cable - 
 
After the execution of the Failure Assessment agent, the Post-hit Coordination agent 
called the Post-hit Reconfiguration for Restoration agent. The results of the Post hit 
Reconfiguration for Restoration agent and the System Analysis agent, for this case, are 
shown in Table 4.13. In this case, the System Analysis agent was not called as no load 
was found to be reconfigurable. 
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Table 4.13 
Results of Post-hit Reconfiguration for Restoration Agent and System Analysis Agent for Hit at  
(285,35,-4) 
Output of Post-hit Reconfiguration 
for Restoration agent Output of System Analysis agent De-energized 
Load Is 
Reconfigurable? 
Reconfiguration 
actions 
Constraint 
Violated? 
Description of 
constraint violation 
Galley1 No - - - 
Galley2 No - - - 
LCP1AB No - - - 
LCP1BC No - - - 
LCP1CA No - - - 
Cmsry No - - - 
 
Finally, the results of the Post-hit Coordination agent are given in the Table 4.14. 
 
Table 4.14 
Results of Post-hit Coordination Agent for Actual Hit at (285,35,-4) 
De-energized 
Load 
Restorable 
or 
Unrestorable 
Suggested 
reconfiguration 
actions for 
restorable loads 
Reason for load being 
Unrestored 
Galley1 Unrestorable - No reconfigurable path 
Galley2 Unrestorable - No reconfigurable path 
LCP1AB Unrestorable - No reconfigurable path 
LCP1BC Unrestorable - No reconfigurable path 
LCP1CA Unrestorable - No reconfigurable path 
Cmsry Unrestorable - No reconfigurable path 
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4.3.3.3 Hit at Randomly Selected Location 3 
The missile hit location was randomly chosen as (295,50,3). In this case, the 
damaged components obtained by the cookie-cutter method explained earlier are shown 
in Table 4.15. 
 
Table 4.15 
Damaged Components Obtained by the Cookie-Cutter Approach for Hit at (295,50,3) 
Damaged Components Component type 
C1114, C1117, C1310, 
C1311 Cable 
Galley1, Galley2 Load 
 
The results of the Failure Assessment agent, in this case, are shown in the Table 
4.16. 
 
Table 4.16 
Results of the Failure Assessment Agent for Hit at (295,50,3) 
Components in 
Faulted Sections Component type De-energized loads 
C1114, C1117 Cable - 
 
After the execution of the Failure Assessment agent, the Post-hit Coordination agent 
called the Post-hit Reconfiguration for Restoration agent. The results of the Post hit 
Reconfiguration for Restoration agent and the System Analysis agent, for this case, are 
shown in Table 4.17. In this case, the System Analysis agent determined that there were 
no system constraint violations. 
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Table 4.17 
Results of Post-hit Reconfiguration for Restoration Agent and System Analysis Agent for Hit at 
(295,50,,3) 
Output of Post-hit Reconfiguration 
for Restoration agent Output of System Analysis agent De-energized 
Load Is 
Reconfigurable? 
Reconfiguration 
actions 
Constraint 
Violated? 
Description of 
constraint violation 
Galley1 No - - - 
Galley2 No - - - 
LCP1AB Yes Close CBSB0206 No - 
LCP1BC Yes Close CBSB0206 No - 
LCP1CA Yes Close CBSB0206 No - 
Cmsry Yes Close CBLC1207 No - 
 
In this case, loads LCP1AB, LCP1BC, LCP1CA, and Cmsry were de-energized due 
to the control actions in the pre-hit reconfiguration process. In the post-hit restoration 
process these loads were restored. Finally, the results of the Post-hit Coordination agent 
are given in the Table 4.18. 
 
Table 4.18 
Results of Post-hit Coordination Agent for Actual Hit at (295,50,3) 
De-energized 
Load 
Restorable or 
Unrestorable 
Suggested 
reconfiguration 
actions for restorable 
loads 
Reason for load being 
Unrestored 
Galley1 Unrestorable - No reconfigurable path 
Galley2 Unrestorable - No reconfigurable path 
LCP1AB Restorable Close CBSB0206 - 
LCP1BC Restorable Close CBSB0206 - 
LCP1CA Restorable Close CBSB0206 - 
Cmsry Restorable Close CBLC1207 - 
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4.3.3.4 Hit at Randomly Selected Location 4 
The missile hit location was randomly chosen as (273,35,-7). In this case, the 
damaged components obtained by the cookie-cutter method explained earlier are shown 
in Table 4.19. 
 
Table 4.19 
Damaged Components Obtained by the Cookie-Cutter Approach for Hit at (273,35,-7) 
Damaged Components Component type 
C1205, C1213, C1303, 
C0205AB, C0205BC, 
C0205CA, C0213AB, 
C0213BC, C0213CA 
Cable 
LCP1AB, LCP1BC, 
LCP1CA, LCP6AB, 
LCP6BC, LCP6CA 
Load 
Xfmr1, Xfmr6 Transformer 
 
The results of the Failure Assessment agent, in this case, are shown in the Table 
4.20. 
 
Table 4.20 
Results of the Failure Assessment Agent for Hit at (273,35,-7) 
Components in 
Faulted Sections Component type De-energized loads 
C1213, C1303 Cable LCP6AB, LCP6BC, LCP6CA 
  
 
The de-energized loads in this case were identified as LCP6AB, LCP6BC, and 
LCP6CA. After the execution of the Failure Assessment agent, the Post-hit Coordination 
agent called the Post-hit Reconfiguration for Restoration agent. The results of the Post 
hit Reconfiguration for Restoration agent and the System Analysis agent, for this case, 
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are shown in Table 4.21. In this case, the System Analysis agent determined that there 
were no system constraint violations. 
 
Table 4.21 
Results of Post-hit Reconfiguration for Restoration Agent and System Analysis Agent for Actual Hit at 
(273,35,-7) 
Output of Post-hit Reconfiguration 
for Restoration agent Output of System Analysis agent De-energized 
Load Is 
Reconfigurable? 
Reconfiguration 
actions 
Constraint 
Violated? 
Description of 
constraint violation 
LCP6AB No - - - 
LCP6BC No - - - 
LCP6CA No - - - 
Galley1 Yes Close CBLC4201 No - 
Galley2 Yes Close CBLC4202 No - 
LCP1AB No - - - 
LCP1BC No - - - 
LCP1CA No - - - 
Cmsry Yes Close CBLC1207 No - 
 
Finally, the results of the Post-hit Coordination agent are given in the Table 4.22. 
 
Table 4.22 
Results of Post-hit Coordination Agent for Actual Hit at (273,35,-7) 
De-energized 
Load 
Restorable 
or 
Unrestorable 
Suggested 
reconfiguration 
actions for 
restorable loads 
Reason for being 
Unrestorable 
LCP6AB Unrestorable - No reconfigurable path 
LCP6BC Unrestorable - No reconfigurable path 
LCP6CA Unrestorable - No reconfigurable path 
Galley1 Restorable Close CBLC4201 - 
Galley2 Restorable Close CBLC4202 - 
LCP1AB Unrestorable - No reconfigurable path 
LCP1BC Unrestorable - No reconfigurable path 
LCP1CA Unrestorable - No reconfigurable path 
Cmsry Restorable Close CBLC1207 - 
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4.3.4 Post-hit Restoration without Pre-hit Reconfiguration 
In order to determine the effectiveness of the Predictive Reconfiguration 
methodology, post-hit reconfiguration for restoration was also performed assuming that 
no pre-hit reconfiguration was performed. It was performed for all the cases discussed in 
sections 4.3.3.1, 4.3.3.2, 4.3.3.3, and 4.3.3.4. The results from various agents for each of 
those cases are given below. 
4.3.4.1 Hit at Randomly Selected Location 1 
The damaged components in this case due to the missile hit were the same as given 
in section 4.3.3.1. The results of the Failure Assessment agent, in this case, are shown in 
the Table 4.23.  
 
Table 4.23 
Results of the Failure Assessment Agent for Hit at (285,35,-4), Without Pre-hit Reconfiguration 
Components in Faulted Sections Component type De-energized loads 
C1205, C1303, C1305 Cable 
Elex1AB, Elex1BC, Elex1CA, 
LCP1AB, LCP1BC, LCP1CA, 
Galley1, Galley2, Elex3, and 
Elex4 
 
After the execution of the Failure Assessment agent, the Post-hit Coordination agent 
called the Post-hit Reconfiguration for Restoration agent. The results of the Post-hit 
Reconfiguration for Restoration agent and the System Analysis agent, for this case, are 
shown in Table 4.24. There were no system constraint violations in this case. 
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Table 4.24 
Results of Post-hit Reconfiguration for Restoration Agent and System Analysis Agent for Hit at    
(285,35,-4), Without Pre-hit Reconfiguration 
Output of Post-hit Reconfiguration 
for Restoration agent Output of System Analysis agent De-energized 
Load Is 
Reconfigurable? 
Reconfiguration 
actions 
Constraint 
Violated? 
Description of 
constraint violation 
Galley1 No - - - 
Galley2 No - - - 
Elex3 Yes Transfer MBT3 No - 
Elex1AB Yes Transfer MBT1 No - 
Elex1BC Yes Transfer MBT1 No - 
Elex1CA Yes Transfer MBT1 No - 
LCP1AB No - - - 
LCP1BC No - - - 
LCP1CA No - - - 
 
Finally, the results of the Post-hit Coordination agent are given in the Table 4.25. 
 
Table 4.25 
Results of Post-hit Coordination Agent for Hit at (285,35,-4), Without Pre-hit Reconfiguration 
De-energized 
Load 
Restorable or 
Unrestorable 
Suggested reconfiguration 
actions for restorable loads 
Reason for being 
Unrestorable 
Galley1 Unrestorable - No reconfigurable path 
Galley2 Unrestorable - No reconfigurable path 
Elex3 Restorable Transfer MBT3 - 
Elex1AB Restorable Transfer MBT1 - 
Elex1BC Restorable Transfer MBT1 - 
Elex1CA Restorable Transfer MBT1 - 
LCP1AB Unrestorable - No reconfigurable path 
LCP1BC Unrestorable - No reconfigurable path 
LCP1CA Unrestorable - No reconfigurable path 
 
4.3.4.2 Hit at Randomly Selected Location 2 
The damaged components in this case due to the missile hit were same as given in 
section 4.3.3.2. In this case the fault on cable C1214 resulted in a cascading fault 
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condition, leading to fault on cable C1204. This will lead to de-energization of some 
loads downstream of load center LC12. The results of the Failure Assessment agent, in 
this case, are shown in the Table 4.26.  
 
Table 4.26 
Results of the Failure Assessment Agent for Hit at (290,45,-3), Without Pre-hit Reconfiguration 
Components in Faulted Sections Component type De-energized loads 
C1205, C1310, C1114, C1117, 
C1311,C1204 Cable 
Elex1AB, Elex1BC, Elex1CA, 
LCP1AB, LCP1BC, LCP1CA, 
Galley1, Galley2, Elex2, 
LCP6AB, LCP6BC, LCP6CA, 
Cmsry and Torpedo 
 
After the execution of the Failure Assessment agent, the Post-hit Coordination agent 
called the Post-hit Reconfiguration for Restoration agent. The results of the Post-hit 
Reconfiguration for Restoration agent and the System Analysis agent, for this case, are 
shown in Table 4.27. In this case the System Analysis agent determined that there were 
no system constraint violations. 
 
Table 4.27 
Results of Post-hit Reconfiguration for Restoration Agent and System Analysis Agent for Hit at    
(290,45,-3), Without Pre-hit Reconfiguration 
Output of Post-hit Reconfiguration 
for Restoration agent Output of System Analysis agent De-energized 
Load Is 
Reconfigurable? 
Reconfiguration 
actions 
Constraint 
Violated? 
Description of 
constraint violation 
Galley1 No - - - 
Galley2 No - - - 
Elex2 Yes Transfer MBT2 No - 
Torpedo Yes Transfer MBT6 No - 
Elex1AB Yes Transfer MBT1 No - 
Elex1BC Yes Transfer MBT1 No - 
Elex1CA Yes Transfer MBT1 No - 
LCP1AB No - - - 
LCP1BC No - - - 
LCP1CA No - - - 
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Table 4.27 continued 
Output of Post-hit Reconfiguration 
for Restoration agent Output of System Analysis agent De-energized 
Load Is 
Reconfigurable? 
Reconfiguration 
actions 
Constraint 
Violated? 
Description of 
constraint violation 
Cmsry No - - - 
LCP6AB No - - - 
LCP6BC No - - - 
LCP6CA No - - - 
 
Finally, the results of the Post-hit Coordination agent are given in the Table 4.28. 
 
Table 4.28 
Results of Post-hit Coordination Agent for Hit at (30,12,54), Without Pre-hit Reconfiguration 
De-energized 
Load 
Restorable or 
Unrestorable 
Suggested reconfiguration 
actions for restorable loads 
Reason for being 
Unrestorable 
Galley1 Unrestorable - No reconfigurable path 
Galley2 Unrestorable - No reconfigurable path 
Elex2 Restorable Transfer MBT2 - 
Torpedo Restorable Transfer MBT6 - 
Elex1AB Restorable Transfer MBT1 - 
Elex1BC Restorable Transfer MBT1 - 
Elex1CA Restorable Transfer MBT1 - 
LCP1AB Unrestorable - No reconfigurable path 
LCP1BC Unrestorable - No reconfigurable path 
LCP1CA Unrestorable - No reconfigurable path 
Cmsry Unrestorable - No reconfigurable path 
LCP6AB Unrestorable - No reconfigurable path 
LCP6BC Unrestorable - No reconfigurable path 
LCP6CA Unrestorable - No reconfigurable path 
 
4.3.4.3 Hit at Randomly Selected Location 3 
The damaged components in this case due to the missile hit were same as given in 
section 4.3.3.3. The results of the Failure Assessment agent, in this case, are shown in 
the Table 4.29.  
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Table 4.29 
Results of the Failure Assessment Agent for Hit at (295,50,3), Without Pre-hit Reconfiguration 
Components in 
Faulted Sections Component type De-energized loads 
C1114, C1117, C1310 Cable Galley1, Galley2, Elex2, and Torpedo 
 
After the execution of the Failure Assessment agent, the Post-hit Coordination agent 
called the Post-hit Reconfiguration for Restoration agent. The results of the Post-hit 
Reconfiguration for Restoration agent and the System Analysis agent, for this case, are 
shown in Table 4.30. In this case the System Analysis agent determined that there were 
no system constraint violations. 
 
Table 4.30 
Results of Post-hit Reconfiguration for Restoration Agent and System Analysis Agent for Hit at 
(295,50,3), Without Pre-hit Reconfiguration 
Output of Post-hit Reconfiguration 
for Restoration agent Output of System Analysis agent De-energized 
Load Is 
Reconfigurable? 
Reconfiguration 
actions 
Constraint 
Violated? 
Description of 
constraint violation 
Galley1 No - - - 
Galley2 No - - - 
Elex2 Yes Transfer MBT2 No - 
Torpedo Yes Transfer MBT6 No - 
 
Finally, the results of the Post-hit Coordination agent are given in the Table 4.31. 
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Table 4.31 
Results of Post-hit Coordination Agent for Hit at (295,50,3) Without Pre-hit Reconfiguration 
De-energized 
Load 
Restorable or 
Unrestorable 
Suggested reconfiguration 
actions for restorable loads 
Reason for being 
Unrestorable 
Galley1 Unrestorable - No reconfigurable path 
Galley2 Unrestorable - No reconfigurable path 
Elex2 Restorable Transfer MBT2 - 
Torpedo Restorable Transfer MBT6 - 
 
4.3.4.4 Hit at Randomly Selected Location 4 
The damaged components in this case due to the missile hit were same as given in 
section 4.3.3.4. The results of the Failure Assessment agent, in this case, are shown in 
the Table 4.32. 
 
Table 4.32 
Results of the Failure Assessment Agent for Hit at (273,35,-7), Without Pre-hit Reconfiguration 
Components in 
Faulted Sections Component type De-energized loads 
C1205, C1213, C1303 Cable 
Elex1AB, Elex1BC, 
Elex1CA, LCP1AB, 
LCP1BC, LCP1CA, 
LCP6AB, LCP6BC, and 
LCP6CA 
 
After the execution of the Failure Assessment agent, the Post-hit Coordination agent 
called the Post-hit Reconfiguration for Restoration agent. The results of the Post-hit 
Reconfiguration for Restoration agent and the System Analysis agent, for this case, are 
shown in Table 4.33. In this case the System Analysis agent determined that there were 
no system constraint violations. 
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Table 4.33 
Results of Post-hit Reconfiguration for Restoration Agent and System Analysis Agent for Hit at    
(273,35,-7), Without Pre-hit Reconfiguration 
Output of Post-hit Restoration 
agent Output of System Analysis agent De-energized 
Load Is 
Reconfigurable? 
Reconfiguration 
actions 
Constraint 
Violated? 
Description of 
constraint violation 
LCP6AB No - - - 
LCP6BC No - - - 
LCP6CA No - - - 
Elex1AB Yes Transfer MBT1 No - 
Elex1BC Yes Transfer MBT1 No - 
Elex1CA Yes Transfer MBT1 No - 
LCP1AB No - - - 
LCP1BC No - - - 
LCP1CA No - - - 
 
Finally, the results of the Post-hit Coordination agent are given in the Table 4.34. 
 
Table 4.34 
Results of Post-hit Coordination Agent for Hit at (273,35,-7), Without Pre-hit Reconfiguration 
De-energized 
Load 
Restorable or 
Unrestorable 
Suggested reconfiguration 
actions for restorable 
loads 
Reason for being 
Unrestorable 
LCP6AB Unrestorable - No reconfigurable path 
LCP6BC Unrestorable - No reconfigurable path 
LCP6CA Unrestorable - No reconfigurable path 
Elex1AB Restorable Transfer MBT1 - 
Elex1BC Restorable Transfer MBT1 - 
Elex1CA Restorable Transfer MBT1 - 
LCP1AB Unrestorable - No reconfigurable path 
LCP1BC Unrestorable - No reconfigurable path 
LCP1CA Unrestorable - No reconfigurable path 
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4.3.5 Comparison of Results 
In this section, a comparison of results obtained in sections 4.3.3 and 4.3.4 is 
presented. The results obtained in section 4.3.3 were results of performing 
reconfiguration for restoration using the reconfiguration actions determined by the Pre-
hit Coordination agent or in other words they are the results of Predictive 
Reconfiguration. In section 4.3.4, the results were determined assuming no pre-hit 
reconfiguration was performed or in other words they are the results of Restoration 
process. In each situation, reconfiguration for restoration control actions for 4 different 
cases, based on four weapon-hit locations, were determined. The results for both 
situations in each case were compared and are presented below. 
4.3.5.1 Comparison of Reconfiguration for Restoration Results When Weapon Hit 
Location Was Randomly Selected Location 1 
For hit location (285,35,-4), a comparison of results between the cases when pre-hit 
reconfiguration was performed and when it was not performed is shown in Table 4.35. 
For each case, de-energized loads for which reconfiguration for restoration was 
performed, components in faulted sections, and loads which were unrestored have been 
compared. In the case where pre-hit reconfiguration was performed, the number of de-
energized loads and the number of components identified in faulted sections were less. 
Thus pre-hit reconfiguration resulted in isolation of sections that would have caused 
faults in the electrical system.  
 
Table 4.35 
Comparison of Results for Hit Location (285,35-4) 
De-energized Loads considered for 
reconfiguration for restoration 
Components in faulted 
sections 
Unrestored loads 
Predictive 
Reconfiguration 
Restoration 
process 
Predictive 
Reconfiguration
Restoration 
process 
Predictive 
Reconfiguration 
Restoration 
process 
Galley1 Galley1 Galley1 Galley1 
Galley2 Galley2 Galley2 Galley2 
LCP1AB LCP1AB LCP1AB LCP1AB 
LCP1BC LCP1BC 
C1303 
C1205, 
C1303, 
C1305 
LCP1BC LCP1BC 
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Table 4.35 continued 
De-energized Loads considered for 
reconfiguration for restoration 
Components in faulted 
sections 
Unrestored loads 
Predictive 
Reconfiguration 
Restoration 
process 
Predictive 
Reconfiguration
Restoration 
process 
Predictive 
Reconfiguration 
Restoration 
process 
LCP1CA LCP1CA LCP1CA LCP1CA 
Cmsry Elex3   
 Elex1AB   
 Elex1BC   
 Elex1CA 
  
  
 
The reason for lesser number of de-energized loads is because the Pre-hit 
Probabilistic Reconfiguration method was able to predict the components, which would 
be damaged by the weapon hit and also reconfigure each vital load before the actual hit 
to a supply path that allows it to survive faults due to damage. In the situation where the 
Pre-hit Probabilistic Reconfiguration method was performed, loads Elex3, Elex1AB, 
Elex1BC, and Elex1CA were reconfigured before the actual weapon hit took place. For 
example, load Elex3 was reconfigured, before the weapon hit, by transferring MBT3 to 
an alternate path. Hence in general supply interruptions to vital loads were reduced. 
Whereas in the case where no Pre-hit Probabilistic Reconfiguration was performed, the 
vital loads mentioned earlier, were de-energized due to the damage caused by the 
weapon hit. Reduction of supply interruption to vital loads is one of the goals of 
Predictive Reconfiguration, which was achieved in this case. An interruption of 
electrical supply, even for a small time period, to some vital loads can reduce the 
chances of a ship’s survivability. Also, since some components that were damaged due 
to the actual weapon hit were isolated before the hit, when Pre-hit Reconfiguration was 
performed, the chances of cascading faults were also reduced. This was also one of the 
goals of Predictive Reconfiguration. Hence the performance of the Predictive 
Reconfiguration methodology was superior to the performance of Restoration process.  
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4.3.5.2 Comparison of Reconfiguration for Restoration Results When Weapon Hit 
Location Was Randomly Selected Location 2 
In this case also, there were lesser number of de-energized loads, and components in 
faulted sections in the case of Predictive Reconfiguration method as compared to 
Restoration process. This is shown in table 4.36. The reason for that is same as that 
explained in section 4.3.5.1. In case of Predictive Reconfiguration there was no 
interruption of electrical supply to any of the vital loads, whereas in the case of 
Restoration method, electrical supply to vital loads Elex1AB, Elex1BC, Elex1CA, 
Torpedo, and Elex2 was interrupted and was later on restored by reconfiguration for 
restoration method. Also, in this case, fault on cable C1204 resulted in a cascading fault 
condition in the case of Restoration process that eventually caused fault on cable C1204. 
This resulted in de-energization of non-vital loads Cmsry, LCP6AB, LCP6BC, and 
LCP6CA. These loads were unrestorable in the Restoration process. Whereas in 
Predictive Reconfiguration method cable C1204 was isolated due to control actions of 
Pre-hit Probabilistic Reconfiguration method, hence the cascading fault condition was 
averted. Hence the performance of the developed Predictive Reconfiguration 
methodology was superior to the performance of Restoration process performed without 
pre-hit reconfiguration. 
 
Table 4.36 
Comparison of Results for Hit Location (290,45,-3) 
De-energized Loads 
considered for restoration 
Components in faulted 
sections 
Unrestored loads 
Predictive 
Reconfiguration 
Restoration 
process 
Predictive 
Reconfiguration 
Restoration 
process 
Predictive 
Reconfiguration 
Restoration 
process 
Galley1 Galley1 Galley1 Galley1 
Galley2 Galley2 Galley2 Galley2 
LCP1AB Elex2 LCP1AB LCP1AB 
LCP1BC Torpedo LCP1BC LCP1BC 
LCP1CA Elex1AB LCP1CA LCP1CA 
Cmsry Elex1BC Cmsry Cmsry 
 Elex1CA  LCP6AB 
 LCP1AB 
C1114, C1117 
C1205, 
C1310, 
C1114, 
C1117, 
C1311 
 LCP6BC 
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Table 4.36 continued 
De-energized Loads 
considered for restoration 
Components in faulted 
sections 
Unrestored loads 
Predictive 
Reconfiguration 
Restoration 
process 
Predictive 
Reconfiguration 
Restoration 
process 
Predictive 
Reconfiguration 
Restoration 
process 
 LCP1BC  LCP6CA 
 LCP1CA   
 Cmsry   
 LCP6AB   
 LCP6BC   
 LCP6CA 
  
  
 
4.3.5.3 Comparison of Reconfiguration for Restoration Results When Weapon Hit 
Location Was Randomly Selected Location 3 
In this case nearly same numbers of loads were de-energized in the cases of 
Predictive Reconfiguration and Restoration process. But the numbers of components in 
faulted sections were less for Predictive Reconfiguration. Hence the chances of 
cascading faults were reduced. The comparison is shown in table 4.37. In this case also, 
there was no interruption of electrical supply any vital load in the case of Predictive 
Reconfiguration whereas in Restoration method, 2 vital loads were required to be 
restored. But it can be seen that, in this case the performance of Predictive 
Reconfiguration is not superior to Restoration process, as compared to cases in section 
4.3.5.1 and 4.3.5.2. The reason for that is because in this case the miss distance of 
missile, with respect to the predicted hit location was large. It was 14.5 feet. This 
affected the accuracy of computing the EPOD values for the electrical components. So 
in this case LC1AB, LCP1BC, LCP1CA, and Cmsry were de-energized by the Pre-hit 
Probabilistic Reconfiguration module as it expected that the cable C1205 and C1214, 
upstream of those loads, have a very high probability of getting damaged. But when the 
actual hit occurred, cable C1205 and C1214 was not damaged. Hence the de-
energization of these loads was unnecessary. 
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Table 4.37 
Comparison of Results for Hit Location (295,50,3) 
De-energized Loads 
considered for restoration 
Components in faulted 
sections Unrestored loads 
Predictive 
Reconfiguration 
Restoration 
process 
Predictive 
Reconfiguration 
Restoration 
process 
Predictive 
Reconfiguration 
Restoration 
process 
Galley1 Galley1 Galley1 Galley1 
Galley2 Galley2 Galley2 Galley2 
LCP1AB Elex2   
LCP1BC Torpedo   
LCP1CA    
Cmsry  
C1114, C1117 
C1114, 
C1117, 
C1310, 
C1311 
  
 
4.3.5.4 Comparison of Reconfiguration for Restoration Results When Weapon Hit 
Location Was Randomly Selected Location 4 
In this case also, the performance of Predictive Reconfiguration was more or less 
same as that of Restoration process. The number of de-energized loads and unrestored 
loads in this case were nearly equal. This is shown in table 4.38. The reason for that is 
because in this case also the miss distance of missile was large. It was 18.4 feet. It 
should be mentioned, though, that in this case also, the de-energized loads in the case of 
Predictive Reconfiguration method were all non-vital loads where as in the case 
Restoration process, 3 vital loads, Elex1AB, Elex1BC, and Elex1CA were also de-
energized but were later restored.    
 
Table 4.38 
Comparison of Results for Hit Location (273,35,-7) 
De-energized Loads considered 
for restoration Components in faulted sections Unrestored loads 
Predictive 
Reconfiguration
Restoration 
process 
Predictive 
Reconfiguration 
Restoration 
process 
Predictive 
Reconfiguration 
Restoration 
process 
LCP6AB LCP6AB LCP6AB LCP6AB 
LCP6BC LCP6BC LCP6BC LCP6BC 
LCP6CA LCP6CA 
C1213, C1303 C1205, C1213, C1303 
LCP6CA LCP6CA 
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Table 4.38 continued 
De-energized Loads considered 
for restoration Components in faulted sections Unrestored loads 
Predictive 
Reconfiguration
Restoration 
process 
Predictive 
Reconfiguration 
Restoration 
process 
Predictive 
Reconfiguration 
Restoration 
process 
Galley1 Elex1AB LCP1AB LCP1AB 
Galley2 Elex1BC LCP1BC LCP1BC 
LCP1AB Elex1CA LCP1CA LCP1CA 
LCP1BC LCP1AB   
LCP1CA LCP1BC   
Cmsry LCP1CA 
  
  
 
4.4 SUMMARY 
In this chapter a scenario based on a missile hit to the test ship model, was presented 
to illustrate the Predictive Reconfiguration method. Results of the various agents from 
four cases, based on four weapon hit locations, were also presented. In section 4.3.5, 
comparison of the Predictive Reconfiguration method and a reconfiguration for 
restoration method without pre-hit reconfiguration was presented. It was found that the 
Predictive Reconfiguration method was very effective for cases when the miss distance 
of actual missile hit was not large. In such cases, the Predictive Reconfiguration method 
was able to achieve its goal of reduction in supply interruption of vital loads and 
prevention of cascading faults. In other words, it was found that the effectiveness of 
Predictive Reconfiguration methodology is dependent on the accuracy of the prediction 
of the probability density function for the weapon-hit location. However, even in the 
case of inaccurate predictions for weapon hit location, the results of Predictive 
Reconfiguration method were either slightly better or at least the same as the results 
obtained by performing reconfiguration for restoration without pre-hit reconfiguration. 
Hence it can be concluded that the proposed Predictive Reconfiguration methodology is 
an effective methodology and its performance is superior to that of performing 
reconfiguration for restoration without pre-hit reconfiguration. 
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5 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 
5.1 CONCLUSIONS 
As a part of the research work conducted at the Power System Automation 
Laboratory (PSAL), a Predictive Reconfiguration methodology was developed and 
implemented for Shipboard Power Systems (SPS). This methodology was developed to 
determine control actions for reconfiguring a SPS, before a weapon hit, such that the 
damage that will be caused to the SPS is reduced. 
The problem of Predictive Reconfiguration was formulated. The problem was to 
reduce the damage that will be caused by a weapon hit. In order to solve this problem, 
the interruption of supply to vital loads and the electrical faults and cascading faults that 
might be caused by the weapon hit should be reduced. In order to achieve these 
objectives, a method to assess the damage that will be caused by a weapon hit was 
developed. Various factors which affect the damage assessment of a weapon hit before 
the hit were addressed. It was concluded that a probabilistic approach was required to 
assess the weapon damage, before an actual hit. Using the information available from the 
attacker’s point of view, a method to compute the expected probability of damage for an 
electrical component was presented. In developing this method assumptions were made 
that the probability density function of the weapon hit location was known. It was also 
assumed that a function, which describes the probability of kill at a point, situated at a 
given distance from the actual hit location, was known. 
Then a probabilistic approach to reconfigure the SPS, before a weapon hit, to reduce 
the damage that will be caused by the actual weapon hit was presented. This method 
used the expected probability of damage, computed for each electrical component. In 
this method two modules, which addressed two goals of Predictive Reconfiguration, 
were presented. The first module, referred to as Reconfiguration for Component 
Isolation, addressed the “reduction of electrical faults and cascading fault” goal of the 
Predictive Reconfiguration. This module determines control actions for non-vital loads 
CHAPTER V 
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only. The second module, referred to as Reconfiguration for Reduction in Supply 
Interruption, addressed the “reduction of supply interruption to vital load” goal of the 
Predictive Reconfiguration. This module determines control actions for vital loads, only. 
Test cases were presented to explain the both methodology. 
The Pre-hit Probabilistic Reconfiguration method, which implemented both the 
modules, was then presented. It was shown that by executing the Reconfiguration for 
Component Isolation module, first, followed by the execution of Reconfiguration for 
Reduction in Supply Interruption module the goals of Predictive Reconfiguration could 
be achieved. Test cases were presented to illustrate this point. The execution of Pre-hit 
Probabilistic Reconfiguration determined control action to reconfigure the SPS such that 
the damage that will be caused by the weapon hit was reduced.  
The methodology was implemented using Multi-Agent technology. A Multi-Agent 
System (MAS) was developed to implement the Pre-hit Probabilistic Reconfiguration 
method for the SPSs. This MAS also implemented a Post-hit Reconfiguration for 
Restoration method, which was developed earlier at PSAL. Various agents were 
developed to perform various tasks, which can be considered as specialized tasks. The 
structure of each of these agents were presented and discussed. 
An illustration of the methodology was presented for a scenario, which considered a 
situation in which a ship was under attack and a missile was fired at the ship. This 
illustration was applied to a test SPS model. This test SPS model was based on the 
reduced electrical layout of a non-nuclear surface combatant ship. In this illustration, 
control actions for the Pre-hit Probabilistic Reconfiguration were obtained assuming the 
probability density function of the missile-hit location and a function that describes 
probability of kill at a point for that missile are given. Some of the determined control 
actions were then implemented. Four cases, assuming four hit locations, were presented. 
These hit locations were randomly chosen with different missile miss distances. Then for 
each of these cases, Post-hit Reconfiguration for Restoration was performed. Post-hit 
Reconfiguration for Restoration was also performed for each of these cases with the 
assumption that no pre-hit reconfiguration was performed earlier. Then the results 
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obtained when pre-hit reconfiguration was performed were compared with results 
obtained when no pre-hit reconfiguration was performed.  
Analysis of these comparisons showed that the effectiveness of the Pre-hit 
Probabilistic method is dependent on the accuracy of the prediction of probability 
density function for weapon-hit location. Of the 4 cases compared, Predictive 
Reconfiguration gave very good results, for two cases. In the other two cases, in which 
the miss distances were large, the results of Predictive Reconfiguration were comparable 
or slightly better than the cases in which no pre-hit reconfiguration was performed. It 
was concluded that the Predictive Reconfiguration methodology is an effective 
methodology and its performance is superior to that of performing reconfiguration for 
restoration without pre-hit reconfiguration. 
5.2 FUTURE WORK 
Work presented in this dissertation discussed a new Predictive Reconfiguration 
method developed to reduce the damage that will be caused by the hit of an incoming 
weapon. The future work in this area can address following aspects: 
The weapon damage assessment methodology developed in this dissertation 
considers only a single weapon hit scenario. A comprehensive weapon damage 
assessment method can be investigated for multiple weapon-hit scenarios. 
While calculating PAP for a radial path, it was assumed that damage to a circuit 
breaker will always cause an open circuit fault condition. The work in this dissertation 
can be extended by considering the effects of short circuit faults on circuit breakers. 
The accuracy of the Pre-hit Probabilistic Reconfiguration methodology is dependent 
on the accuracy of the prediction of the weapon hit location. This methodology should 
be made more to provide high accuracy even for uncertain prediction. 
The Predictive Reconfiguration methodology was not tested with real time 
information/data, as it was not available in the public literature. Hence the methodology 
should be tested with real information/data and more complex test cases using simulated 
data should be designed to test the effectiveness of the methodology. 
The probabilistic information outputted with the control actions determined by the 
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Reconfiguration for Component Isolation (RCI) module is the Path Availability 
Probability (PAP) for the radial path of a the non-vital load, whereas the for the control 
actions determined by the Reconfiguration for Reduction in Supply Interruption (RRSI) 
module, PAP value of the better path and PAP difference are outputted. A uniform 
probabilistic measure should be computed for the control actions determined by either 
RCI module or RRSI module. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
The global databases consist of GIS, Historical and Constraint databases. The 
structures of each of these databases are given below. 
 
GIS DATABASE 
 
The GIS database has connectivity, dynamic and static information for each type of 
electrical component.  
 
Component 
Type 
Connectivity 
Information Dynamic Information Static Information 
Bus Transfer 
Type, node on normal 
side, node on alternate 
side, node on load side 
Working Status, BT 
Position - 
Cable Phase Type, from nodes, to nodes 
Working Status, Current 
Magnitude, Current 
Phase, Voltage 
Magnitude, Voltage 
Phase 
No. of parallel cables, Length, 
Rated Voltage, Ampacity, Size, 
Resistance, Self Inductance, 
Mutual Inductance, Self 
Capacitance, Mutual 
Capacitance, Type 
Circuit 
Breaker 
CB Location Type, from 
node, to node, 
Connected CB 
Working Status, CB 
Status, Current 
Magnitude, Current 
Phase 
Ampere Rating, Power Rating, 
kVar Rating, Time Setting for 
Instant Current, Time Setting 
for Instant Time, Time Setting 
for Short Current, Time Setting 
for Short Time, Time Setting 
for Long Current, Time Setting 
for Long Time, Type 
Generator from node, to node, Connected CB 
Working Status,  
Current Magnitude, 
Current Phase, Voltage 
Magnitude, Voltage 
Phase, Power, Speed 
Frequency 
Voltage Rating, Active Power 
Rating, Reactive Power Rating, 
Rated Frequency, Rated Speed, 
Rated Power factor, Type 
Load Center 
from node, to node, 
Connected CB, 
Connected SB 
Current Magnitude, 
Current Phase, Voltage 
Magnitude, Voltage 
Phase 
Voltage Rating 
Load 
Connected BT, 
Connected LVPR, 
Phase Type, from node, 
Connected CB normal 
side, Connected CB 
alternate side, 
Connected Unit normal 
side, Connected Unit 
alternate side, 
Working Status,  
Current Magnitude, 
Current Phase, Voltage 
Magnitude, Voltage 
Phase 
Voltage Rating, , Rated 
Frequency, Rated Power factor, 
Type, Rated Power, Full Load 
Current, Starting Current, 
Priority, Impedance Rating, 
Resistance, Reactance, 
Inductance 
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Connected Transformer, 
LVP/LVR Type, Phase Type, from node, to node 
Working status, LVPR 
status, Current 
Magnitude, Current 
Phase, Voltage 
Magnitude, Voltage 
Phase 
- 
Power Panel 
from node, to node, 
Connected CB, 
Connected LC or SB 
Working status,  Current 
Magnitude, Current 
Phase, Voltage 
Magnitude, Voltage 
Phase 
- 
Switchboard 
from node, to node, 
Connected CB, 
Connected generator 
Working status,  Current 
Magnitude, Current 
Phase, Voltage 
Magnitude, Voltage 
Phase 
Voltage Rating 
Transformer from node, to node 
Working status,  Current 
Magnitude, Current 
Phase, Voltage 
Magnitude, Voltage 
Phase 
Voltage Rating, Tap Position, 
Power Rating, Turns Ratio 
 
 
The GIS database also has a System table, which contains geographical information 
for each electrical component. Its structure is as given below. 
 
Table Name Information stored 
Systemtable Component Name, Component Type, Connection Status, Deck Frame, Alignment, X, Y, Z 
 
 
HISTORICAL DATABASE 
 
The Historical database stores real time information for a period starting from a pre-
fault time to some time after the fault had occurred and the system had attained steady 
state. It consisted of tables for each circuit breaker, load center and switchboard in the 
system. The structure of these tables is given below.  
 
Component Type Information stored 
Circuit Breaker Time Step, CB Status, Currents in each phase 
Load Center Time Step, Voltage for each phase 
Switchboard Time Step, Voltage for each phase 
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CONSTRAINT DATABASE 
 
The Constraint database consisted of tables that store constraint information for 
various components. There were five tables. The structure of each table is given below. 
 
 
Table Name Information stored 
CableCurrent Cable Name, Upper Current Limit 
LoadVoltage Load Name, Lower Voltage Limit, Upper Voltage Limit 
Frequency Generator Name, Lower Frequency Limit, Upper Frequency Limit 
CBCurrent CB Name, Lower Current Limit, Upper Current Limit 
SBVoltage Switchboard Name, Lower Voltage Limit, Upper Voltage Limit 
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